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Summary 
 
In 2001, the European Commission endorsed a future company tax strategy that 
would allow EU companies the option of calculating their EU profits on a common 
consolidated tax base and allow Member States to tax their share of that base at 
national rates. Implementing this strategy requires developing a formula to distribute 
the common tax base across the Member States.  
 
Although EU Member States currently do not use formulary methods to distribute a 
common consolidate tax base across national boundaries, Canada and the United 
States have extensive experience using formulary methods to distribute income across 
sub-national boundaries. Thus, the European Union can turn to North America to gain 
valuable insights into the design of a formulary apportionment system with common 
base taxation. 
 
This paper evaluates key issues that may arise when implementing common 
consolidated base taxation with formulary apportionment in the EU. These issues 
include the formula design, the definition of the company group and the definition and 
scope of the tax base. The paper also discusses potential economic consequences that 
may arise and suggests a potential apportionment system for the European Union. 
 
A key insight the paper provides includes the importance of reaching agreement on 
the broad contours of a system of EU common consolidated base taxation with 
formulary apportionment. As shown by the U.S. state experience, the main 
controversies over the apportionment system arise from the lack of uniformity across 
the states. For example, although the states begin with a fairly common tax base, they 
differ significantly in how they define the elements of the apportionment formula, the 
composition of the group, and the allocation of certain types of income. By contrast, 
the Canadian provinces use the same formula, the same income tax base and tax 
international income in the same way. In both countries, the sub-national jurisdictions 
may vary the tax rate and apply tax credits to the post-apportionment tax base.  
 
The lack of consolidation is the main shortcoming of in the Canadian approach and 
the inability to move to consolidation highlights the difficulties in adopting 
consolidation once the system is in place. The US state experience reinforces this 
conclusion. Although taxing on a group basis would prevent many of the tax 
avoidance and minimization strategies that exist, the states have found it extremely 
difficult to move to such a system once business has adapted to the current tax 
structure. 
 
The Commission should work to gain sufficient agreement among the Member States 
on the comprehensive approach. Doing so would help avoid the complications that 
exist in the US state approach and, instead, allow the EU to reach the relative 
harmony achieved in the Canadian approach.  
 
Keywords:  Formulary apportionment and allocation; corporate income taxation; 
multinational firms; common consolidated base taxation; EU company tax reform 
 
JEL Classification:  F23, H25, H73 and H87 - 5 - 
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In 2001, the European Commission released a Communication and Study presenting a 
strategy that would allow EU companies to calculate their EU profits on a common 
consolidated tax base and use a common formula to distribute those profits across the 
Member States (
1). This long-term strategy complements the short-term measures 
targeted to eliminate specific tax obstacles. The present strategy proposes a 
comprehensive reform designed to eliminate the cross-border tax obstacles facing EU 
businesses in a single stroke. 
 
As explained in the Study, which was prepared by the European Commission’s 
Directorate General for Taxation and Customs Union, EU businesses should be able 
to compute the income of the entire EU group according to one set of tax rules. 
Individual Member States would tax their share of the tax base at national rates. The 
Commission’s central idea effectively means that the Member States would 
supplement the separate entity accounting with arm’s length pricing principle with a 
system of group taxation with formulary apportionment (
2). 
 
The Commission presents a strong argument supporting its strategy. The 
Communication claimed: 
 
“Only providing multinational companies with a consolidated 
corporate tax base for their EU-wide activities will really, through a 
single framework of company taxation, systematically tackle the 
majority of the tax obstacles to cross-border economic activity in the 
Single Market (
3)”  (emphasis in the original). 
 
According to the Commission, the application of separate rules to calculate company 
income in each Member State creates numerous tax obstacles to cross-border 
economic activity in the Internal Market. At present, companies must determine the 
amount of profits earned in each Member State according to the company tax rules in 
each Member State. The Commission Study views this process as inconsistent with a 
single European market with no internal tax borders.  
                                                 
(
1) See the European Commission Communication (2001), “Towards an Internal Market without Tax 
Obstacles” (the Communication) and the European Commission Study (2002), “Company Taxation in 
the Internal Market” (the Study). The Commission released both documents on October 23, 2001. It 
subsequently published the Study in April 2002. All references to the Study will be to the April 2002 
book. The Commission Study notes that panels of academics and experts from among the business 
community and social partners at the Community level assisted in preparing the study. See Weiner 
(2002b) for a related analysis of the Commission’s proposals. 
(
2) The comprehensive approach would be optional and would not replace existing tax systems in 
Member States, which would exist parallel to the optional comprehensive system. 
(
3) See the Communication (2001, p. 15). - 8 - 
 
The Commission Study emphasizes two fundamental points: 
 
1)  By definition, an essential element of all the solutions is that there should 
be group consolidation on an EU-wide basis; and 
 
2)  A further key element of all the comprehensive approaches is a mechanism 




The Commission recognizes the significance of this change in calling its endorsement 
of a consolidated corporate tax base for the Internal Market a “major development".    
The comprehensive approaches envisage eliminating the need for companies to 
comply with up to 15 (now 25) different company income tax systems. The 
Commission emphasizes that its future work will be directed toward providing EU 
companies with a consolidated corporate tax base for their EU-wide activities and 
developing an appropriate apportionment mechanism that can be agreed by all 
participants.  
 
A formulary mechanism for distributing the common consolidated tax base is a key 
component of group taxation at the EU level. The Commission Study discusses two 
mechanisms for allocating the common tax base (
5). Under the first mechanism, 
profits would be distributed across the Member States according to the formulary 
apportionment methods used in the United States and Canada. These methods use 
factors, such as the shares of property, payroll and gross receipts, to distribute the tax 
base across the states and provinces, respectively. Under the second mechanism, 
profits would be apportioned according to the share of the total adjusted value added 
tax base measured on an origin basis in each Member State.  
 
Scope of this working paper 
 
This working paper presents the main analysis and results from a research project 
conducted by the author for the Directorate General for Taxation and Customs Union 
of the European Commission. In addition to that research, the analysis in the paper 
draws from earlier and ongoing work by the author (
6). 
 
The Commission imposed the following assumptions and restrictions on the analysis 
for the research project:   
 
(1)  The factors and weights applied to the factors will be identical in all 
Member States taking part in the system. If several formulae are 
considered, e.g., according to sectors, these should be identical across 
countries; 
 
(2)  Rates to apply to the base will differ among Member States; 
 
                                                 
(
4) See paragraphs 67 and 69 of the Executive summary of the Study (p. 25). 
(
5) See paragraph 69 of the Executive summary of the Study (p. 25). 
(
6) See Weiner (1994, 1999 and forthcoming, 2005). - 9 - 
(3)  The water’s edge principle will also apply, meaning that formulary 
apportionment is a system applied to the common tax base and on an EU 
basis (or for the subgroup of companies that would apply the scheme). 
 
This working paper analyzes some key issues concerning the design of a company tax 
system with group taxation and formulary apportionment for the European Union. 
Section 2 discusses the basic issues that arise when designing a formulary 
apportionment system. It presents the historical development of the approach in North 
America, the economic theory behind formulary apportionment and issues concerning 
the definitions and locations of the apportionment factors. Section 3 discusses the 
definition of the company group. Section 4 discusses the tax base and territorial scope 
of the system. Section 5 discusses economic consequences that may arise when using 
a formula to distribute income across jurisdictions. Section 6 draws from this analysis 
to assess the key issues concerning the design of a formulary apportionment system 
with group taxation in the European Union. 
 
 
2. DESIGNING A  FORMULARY APPORTIONMENT  SYSTEM: 
THE FORMULA 
2.1 Background 
2.1.1  Formulary apportionment and separate entity accounting  
 
Formulary apportionment and separate entity accounting are two methods of 
determining the amount of income a multijurisdictional company earns in each 
separate jurisdiction where it does business. 
 
Under formulary apportionment, a company distributes, or apportions, its total income 
across the locations where it does business using a formula based on the share of 
activity it conducts in that location. By using a formula to distribute total profits 
across locations, the company does not need to calculate the profits earned by each 
member of the group in each location. 
 
Formulary apportionment can be applied to distribute the income of a single entity, as 
in Canada, or to distribute the income of a related group of corporations, as in many 
US states.  
 
Under separate entity accounting, a multinational entity (MNE) treats each enterprise 
within the group as a separate entity. The MNE determines the source of income 
generally by computing the income earned by each related entity in a jurisdiction 
according to the entity’s financial accounts and following the source rules in each 
location’s tax system. The parent company calculates its accounts as if each related 
entity operated as an independent entity at arm’s length.  
 
Under the arm’s length principle, which underlies separate entity accounting, a 
multinational corporate group should price transactions with its affiliated entities as if 
those transactions had occurred with unrelated entities. For tax purposes, affiliated - 10 - 
businesses should set transfer prices at levels that would have prevailed had the 
transactions occurred between unrelated parties. To do so, firms identify market-based 
prices for goods and services transferred within the firm. The goal of the separate 
entity accounting with arm’s length pricing approach is to obtain a result that 
approximates the result that independent entities would reach in the market. 
 
Application of the arm’s length principle should eliminate any special conditions that 
may affect the level of profits. As the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) explains, by providing broad parity of tax treatment for 
multinational enterprises and independent enterprises, the arm’s length principle 
eliminates any tax advantages or disadvantages that might arise solely from the 
organizational form of the enterprise (
7). 
 
Formulary apportionment and separate entity accounting provide distinct approaches 
to determining the income “earned” in a jurisdiction and each method has its staunch 
supporters. Beginning in the 1970s, a heated debate occurred in the United States and 
also among the member countries of the OECD and the individual Member States of 
the European Union, over the merits and demerits of using formulary apportionment 
to distribute income across international boundaries (
8). Since then, developments 
within the European Union, particularly with the creation of the Internal Market, have 
changed the underlying economic and business conditions prevailing in the EU and 
have made a formulary apportionment system seem more attractive for the European 
Union. There is now reasonably broad recognition within the European Union that a 
form of “allocation by formula” of total EU profits may be necessary to allow EU 




2.1.2  A brief history of formulary apportionment 
 
The US states and Canadian provinces have extensive experience with the formulary 
apportionment system. (The system is referred to as formulary allocation in Canada.)  






United States experience 
 
The US states began using formulary apportionment at the end of the 19
th century for 
purposes of levying the property and capital stock tax on the transcontinental railroad 
                                                 
(
7)  See OECD (2001), paragraph 5, P-2 and paragraph 1.7 p. I-3. 
(
8) For examples of some of these views, see Coffill and Willson (1993), Miller (1995), Culbertson 
(1995) and OECD (2001). 
(
9)  For examples, see UNICE (1998, 2000). 
(
10)  See Weiner (2005) for additional analysis. - 11 - 
system (
11). Instead of measuring the property value in each state, companies 
generally measured their total property value (railroad track, rolling stock, franchise, 
etc.) as a single unit and distributed that total across the states according to the value 
of the railway lines located in each state relative to the total value in all of the states. 
The so-called “unit rule” of formulary taxation, which apportioned the value of the 
entire enterprise (unit) using a formula, arose from this process (
12). 
  
Wisconsin, which in 1911 became the first state to adopt the corporate income tax, 
applied formulary apportionment using a formula based on the shares of property, cost 
of manufacture and sales. Wisconsin justified using the apportionment method 
because it viewed calculating separate accounts as infeasible since most 
manufacturing corporations, as did the railway companies, conducted their business in 
several states. Following adoption of the federal income tax in 1913, an increasing 
number of states adopted the corporate income tax and used a formula to distribute 
total income across the states. 
 
Although the Supreme Court had validated the use of formulary apportionment in 
several property and capital tax cases at the turn of the century, it had not yet 
addressed the use of a formula for apportioning income. In 1920, the Supreme Court 
found constitutional the apportionment method for distributing the net income of a 
manufacturing corporation across the states for income tax purposes (
13). In this 
particular case, the state (Connecticut) used a single factor property formula to 
apportion the net income of a company that conducted all of its manufacturing in one 
state but had branches and inventory in other states and sold its products nationwide. 
As the Court explained, the company did not show that “the method of apportionment 
adopted by the state was inherently arbitrary, or that its application to this corporation 
produced an unreasonable result” (
14).  
 
By the 1930s, most states had adopted the formulary method, with business support, 
to tax the income of multistate businesses. A National Tax Association (NTA) survey 
taken in 1938 showed that most states and businesses preferred formula 
apportionment to separate accounting. 
 
Many of the early apportionment formulae included a range of elements, including 
property values, inventory, manufacturing costs, labor expenditures, accounts 
receivable, purchases, etc. However, the three-factor property, payroll and gross 
receipts formula rather quickly became the standard formula. In 1933, the NTA, 
which worked to develop common apportionment practices, advocated that the states 
adopt the most widely used formula in the states, the so-called “Massachusetts” 
formula that used equally-weighted property, payroll and gross receipts factors.  
 
The common three-factor formula also spread among the states, in part, through the 
Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA) of 1957. UDITPA 
                                                 
(
11) For details on the history of US state apportionment practices, see Weiner (1994), Hellerstein 
(1993) and Hellerstein and Hellerstein (1998). 
(
12) See Pullman’s Palace Car Company v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891) and Adams Express Co. 
v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U.S. 194 (1897). 
(
13)Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 S.Ct. 45 (1920). 
(
14) See Underwood Typewriter (1920) at pp. 120-121. - 12 - 
provides uniform definitions of the factors and treatment of various types of income. 
By the 1950s, nearly all of the states that taxed corporate income used the 
Massachusetts formula.  
 
Since its creation in the late 1960s, the Multistate Tax Commission (MTC) has also 
had a strong influence on state apportionment systems (
15). As part of its mandate, the 
MTC issues rules and regulations concerning multistate taxation. It also has 
developed several programs designed to improve compliance with multistate 
corporate income tax requirements. These programs include the Joint Audit Program, 
the National Nexus Program and the Unitary Exchange Project, among others. The 
Federation of Tax Administrators also assists in multistate tax matters. 
 
Since the early 1980s, the states have moved toward a formula that increases the 
weight on the gross receipts factor and decreases the weight on property and payroll 
(while keeping the weights on property and payroll identical). Table 1, which lists the 
tax rates and formula in each state, shows that as of 2004, the average weight on the 
property and payroll factors is just under 25 percent, each and that the average weight 
on the gross receipts factor is just over 50 percent. With 23 states using this formula, 
the double-weighted sales formula is now the most common state formula. Fourteen 
states (including the District of Columbia) use the Massachusetts formula.  
                                                 
(
15) The MTC is a state government agency created by the states in 1967 through the Multistate Tax 
Compact that works to help make state tax systems “fair, effective and efficient” and encourages states 
to adopt uniform state tax laws and regulations. The Multistate Tax Compact incorporates the income 
division rules outlined in UDITPA. See Corrigan (1976) for a history of the Multistate Tax 
Commission. - 13 - 
 
 
 Table 1. US State Corporate Income Tax Information, January 1, 2004 
 Standard  Apportionment 
Formula (weight on each factor) 
 
 Tax  Rate 
(%) 




1 Alabama  6.5    1/3     1/3     1/3    
2 Alaska  9.4    1/3     1/3     1/3   yes 
3 Arizona  6.968    1/4     1/4     1/2   yes 
4 Arkansas  6.5    1/4     1/4     1/2    
5 California  8.84    1/4     1/4     1/2   yes 
6 Colorado  4.63    1/3     1/3     1/3   yes 
7 Connecticut  7.5    1/4     1/4     1/2    
8 Delaware  8.7    1/3     1/3     1/3    
9 Florida  5.5    1/4     1/4     1/2    
10  Georgia 6    1/4     1/4     1/2    
11  Hawaii 6.4    1/3     1/3     1/3   yes 
12  Idaho 7.6    1/4     1/4     1/2   yes 
13  Illinois 7.3  0       0       1       yes 
14  Indiana 8.5    1/4     1/4     1/2    
15  Iowa 12  0       0       1       yes 
16  Kansas 4    1/3     1/3     1/3    
17  Kentucky 8.25    1/4     1/4     1/2    
18  Louisiana 8    1/4     1/4     1/2    
19  Maine 8.93    1/4     1/4     1/2   yes 
20  Maryland 7    1/4     1/4     1/2    
21  Massachusetts 9.5    1/4     1/4     1/2    
22  Michigan      1/20    1/20    9/10   
23  Minnesota 9.8  1/8  1/8    3/4   yes 
24  Mississippi 5    1/3     1/3     1/3    
25  Missouri 6.25    1/3     1/3     1/3    
26  Montana 6.75    1/3     1/3     1/3   yes 
27  Nebraska 7.81  0       0       1       yes 
28  Nevada  No Corporate Income Tax 
29  New Hampshire  8.5    1/4     1/4     1/2   yes 
30  New Jersey  9    1/4     1/4     1/2    
31  New Mexico  7.6    1/4     1/4     1/2    
32  New York  7.5    1/4     1/4     1/2    
33  North Carolina  6.9    1/4     1/4     1/2    
34  North Dakota  10.5    1/3     1/3     1/3   yes 
35  Ohio 8.5    1/5     1/5     3/5    
36  Oklahoma 6    1/3     1/3     1/3    
37  Oregon 6.6    1/10    1/10    4/5   yes 
38  Pennsylvania 9.99    1/5     1/5     3/5    
39  Rhode Island  9    3/10    3/10    2/5    
40  South Carolina  5    1/4     1/4     1/2    - 14 - 
 
 Table 1. US State Corporate Income Tax Information, January 1, 2004 
 Standard  Apportionment 
Formula (weight on each factor) 
 
 Tax  Rate 
(%) 




41  South Dakota  No Corporate Income Tax 
42  Tennessee 6.5    1/4     1/4     1/2    
43  Texas  No Corporate Income Tax 
44  Utah 5    1/3     1/3     1/3   yes 
45  Vermont 9.75    1/3     1/3     1/3    
46  Virginia 6    1/4     1/4     1/2    
47  Washington  No Corporate Income Tax 
48  West Virginia  9    1/4     1/4     1/2    
49  Wisconsin 7.9    1/4     1/4     1/2    
50  Wyoming  No Corporate Income Tax 
51  District of 
Columbia 
9.975    1/3     1/3     1/3    
  Average in states 
with a corporate 
income tax 
7.453%  24.5%  24.5%  51.1%   
Vermont has adopted mandatory combination effective January 2006. 
Source: Federation of Tax Administrators (2004), State Apportionment of Corporate Income and 
Range of State Corporate Income Tax Rates, and Mazerov (2002). The formulas listed are for general 




 Canadian  experience 
 
The Canadian provinces followed a different path from the US states. Some provinces 
adopted the corporate income tax well before the federal government entered the 
corporate income tax field in 1916. Until World War I, the two levels of government 
jointly taxed corporate income, but did so without any express coordination between 
levels of government. By the end of the 1930s, all of the provinces and the federal 
government taxed corporate income. Most provinces used the federal definition of 
income. However, as part of the WWII Wartime Tax Agreements, the provinces 
ceded the corporate income tax to the federal government to help finance the war. 
 
After the war, the federal and provincial governments developed a model provincial 
corporate income tax act and created the Tax Rental Agreements (TRA). The TRAs 
required finding rules to allocate income across the provinces. According to Smith 
(1976), the purpose of the agreements seems to have been to make corporation taxes 
“reasonably uniform across Canada".  
 
The initial allocation rules assigned income according to the location of a company’s 
permanent establishments. If a company had a permanent establishment in more than 
one province, its income would be divided according to the separate accounts or, if - 15 - 
separate accounts were not available, according to the ratio of gross receipts of the 
permanent establishment to the corporation’s total gross receipts. 
 
A subsequent draft modified the formula to include gross receipts and payroll, with 
each factor weighted by one-half. The income subject to allocation would be limited 
to income from its business functions and would exclude its investment functions. The 
definition of permanent establishment and the distinctions between types of income 
were taken from Canada’s income tax treaties. 
 
Seven provinces joined the first TRAs, with Ontario and Quebec remaining outside of 
the agreements. At that time, the agreeing provinces used the same formula, but 
Ontario and Quebec each used a different formula.  
 
The second TRA introduced a common formula using payroll and gross revenue. In 
another significant change, companies could use separate accounting only if they 




Ontario joined the second TRA and adopted the federal allocation rules, leaving 
Quebec as the only province with a different allocation formula. This situation was 
finally resolved in 1961 when Quebec adopted the formula used in the other 
provinces. 
 
The TRAs evolved into the Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements and then the 
Federal Collection Agreements (FCA). Under the current FCAs, the federal 
government incurs all the provincial collection costs in exchange for provincial 
agreement to levy its tax on the federal base and to use the federal formula.  
 
This uniformity continues to exist even though both Ontario and Alberta no longer 
participate in the agreements. These two provinces, as does Quebec, use the same 
allocation formula as the provinces that participate in the federal agreements. Thus, 
the Canadian provinces have generally used an equally weighted payroll and gross 
revenue formula and the same tax base for half a century. The provinces retain 
significant autonomy, however, as they may apply their own local tax rates and tax 
credits to the post-allocation tax base. 
 
2.2  Designing the formula  
 
The design of the formula for dividing income across jurisdictions depends, in part, on 
the purpose of the formula. This analysis addresses issues concerning manufacturing 
and mercantile industries. Issues concerning other industries are discussed later. 
 
                                                 
(
16) According to Smith (1976), the separate accounts rule was dropped because few companies used it 
and it was an “administrative nightmare".  He also noted that companies could use separate accounting 
in the US states only on request by the company or when required by the tax authority. - 16 - 
 
2.2.1  Economic theory concerning the factors 
 
McLure (1980, 1981a)
 showed that measuring state income using a formula composed 
of the shares of a firm’s property, payroll and sales in that state effectively transforms 
the state corporate income tax into a tax on property, payroll and sales. The expected 
incidence effects in an individual state from using a property, payroll and sales 
formula would be similar to the incidence effects of excise taxes levied directly on 
property, payroll and sales. (The incidence for the sales factor would depend on 
whether sales are measured on a destination or an origin basis.) However, in contrast 
to explicit excise taxes, the implicit excise taxes that arise through apportionment are 
specific to each firm.  
 
Mieszkowski and Morgan (1984) confirmed McLure’s arguments that using the three-
factor formula discourages the use of capital and labor in the taxing state and 
increases relative commodity prices in the state. Symmetric results occur in the non-
taxing (or low tax) states, where apportionment “subsidizes” the factors of production. 
 
Since the formula uses firm-specific factors to apportion profits, the effective tax rate 
on each factor varies with the company’s factor choices. Thus, a company’s 
investment, employment and sales decisions may be distorted because its income is 
distributed using a formula. For example, if the formula includes capital as an 
apportionment factor, when a company invests additional capital in a location, the 
share of income apportioned to that location also increases and, all else equal, its tax 
burden increases in that location (
17). As a result, companies are discouraged from 
using more capital in that location. A similar argument holds for any firm-specific 
factor used to apportion income. 
 
This distortion arises because the effective tax rate under apportionment equals not 
only the direct effect caused by the taxation of the factor but also the indirect effect 
caused by the use of a firm-specific factor used to apportion income (
18). The indirect 
effect can be positive or negative, depending on the relationship between the 
apportionment tax rate in any particular location and the weighted average 
apportionment tax rate over all locations, where the apportionment tax rate is 
weighted by the share of that factor in that location (
19). 
 
To illustrate how such a tax or subsidy might arise, consider the effective tax rate on 
capital in a state. With formulary apportionment based on property (capital) shares, a 
state can reduce the effective tax burden on capital either by reducing the tax rate or 
by reducing the weight applied to the property factor. Weiner (2002a) calculated 
representative apportionment tax rates and marginal effective tax rates (METRs) for 
 
                                                 
(
17) Depending on the level of tax rate in that location and the sensitivity of investment, the tax burden 
may not necessarily increase.  
(
18) For further analysis of these effects, see Weiner (1994). Mieszkowski and Morgan (1984) refer to 
these two effects as the tax-base effect and the apportionment effect. 
(
19) See Weiner (1994) for calculations of these effective tax rates for the states. - 17 - 
capital under apportionment for the EU Member States. Assuming that all other 
Member States use a formula with capital as an apportionment factor, any single 
Member State could create a capital subsidy (a negative METR) by reducing the 
weight on property in the formula. In the EU context, however, Member States would 
likely be prohibited from freely altering the formula. 
 
2.2.2  Practical choices concerning the factors 
 
When choosing the apportionment factors, since corporate income represents a return 
to capital, economic theory suggests apportioning income according to the location of 
capital. However, capital is not the only factor that generates income. Since labor is an 
income-generating factor of production, the formula should reflect labor’s 
contribution to income, either by employee compensation or by the number of 
workers.   
 
In discussing the principles for dividing the state corporate tax base, Musgrave (1984) 
argued that the formula should represent both the supply and the demand sides of 
income. Property and payroll reflect the supply side of income, while sales and gross 
receipts reflect the demand side of income. To reflect the market where consumption 
occurs, sales should be measured on a destination basis. Musgrave also explains that 
separate accounting may be feasible if all income is assigned to the production 
location, but formulary apportionment is necessary to consider the demand side of 
income. Including sales in the formula reflects the notion that demand creates value. 
 
As Musgrave (2000) explained, “There does not appear to be any objective, single 
answer to the question of how company profits should be divided in a 
multijurisdictional setting".   Thus, gaining agreement among jurisdictions on the 
rules for dividing income becomes paramount. The broad use in the US and in Canada 
of a formula that combines origin-based supply and destination-based demand factors 
seems acceptable since it balances the interests of the manufacturing and the 
marketing states. Thus, a balanced supply and demand formula may be politically 
beneficial. 
 
In choosing a payroll and gross receipts formula with equal weights on each factor, 
the Canadian provinces seem to have recognized the benefits of balancing the 
interests of the producing and the marketing provinces. Moreover, by excluding 
capital, this formula eliminates the direct distortion to capital that arises in the three-
factor formula. However, because local tax rates vary, METRs still vary across 
provinces and investment allocation is not perfectly efficient. In addition, the formula 
does not balance the burden on the productive factors of property and payroll. 
 
2.2.3  Judicial Influences on the apportionment formula  
 
Although economic theory helps identify the appropriate factors to include in the 
apportionment formula, within the United States, the judicial process may have had a 
greater influence than economic theory on the apportionment process. Two main 
forces have influenced the design of the apportionment formula in the United States. - 18 - 
The first influence is that the formula must have “internal consistency", meaning that 
if each jurisdiction adopted a particular formula, no more than 100 percent of the 
taxpayer’s business activity would be taxed. The fact that a formula must be internally 
consistent, however, does not say anything about whether the formula, itself, must 
reflect economic activity in that location. 
 
The second judicial influence is that the formula must have “external consistency", 
meaning that the factors used in the formula must reflect a “reasonable sense” of how 
the income was generated or have a “rational relationship” to the activities in the state. 
Reasonableness encompasses a division of income that reflects the economic reality 
of the taxpayer's business activity in the taxing state. In terms of the apportionment 
formula, this requirement means that the factors must be related to a taxpayer’s own 
economic activities in that location. It, thus, precludes using macroeconomic factors 
to apportion company income across the states. 
 
These two influences stem from limitations under the Due Process and Commerce 
clauses of the US Constitution (
20). Due Process requires a definite link or a minimum 
connection (known as “nexus”) between a state and the person, property, or thing the 
state wishes to tax. In addition, the income must be rationally related to values 
connected with the taxing state. Broadly speaking, a state may tax only the share of a 
company’s income that it earns within the state.  
 
The Commerce clause requires that the state corporate income tax meet several tests. 
These tests include that the tax (1) applies to an activity with a substantial nexus with 
the taxing state, (2) is fairly apportioned, (3) does not discriminate against interstate 
commerce, and (4) is fairly related to the services provided by the state (
21).  
 
In cases involving foreign commerce, two additional tests arise under the “dormant” 
foreign commerce clause (
22). First, the tax must not prevent the federal government 
from “speaking with one voice” in matters involving foreign governments. Second, 
the tax must not expose foreign multinationals to an “enhanced risk of multiple 
taxation".  
 
The Supreme Court has sanctioned a variety of formulae, including both a single-
factor property formula and a single-factor destination-based gross receipts formula. 
Although the Court had considered in 1965 whether a gross receipts only formula 
could properly represent income, in 1978, the Court explicitly accepted a single-factor 
gross receipts formula as reasonably indicating where income was earned (
23). 
Moreover, in approving this formula, the Court noted that any double taxation would 
arise because not all of the states used the same formula, not because one state used a 
single-factor formula. The only way to eliminate any possible double taxation would 
                                                 
(
20) U.S. Constitution, amendment XIV, section 1 and U.S. Constitution, article I, section 8, cl. 3.  
(
21) Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977) sets forth these tests. 
(
22)  For the income tax, see Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board of California 512 U.S. 298 
(1994) and Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board of California, 463 U.S. 159 (1983). 
See also Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles 441 U.S. 434 (1979) for an analysis in the context 
of a state property tax. 
(
23) See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978) and General Motors Corp. v. District of 
Columbia, 380 U.S. 553 (1965). - 19 - 




2.2.4  Weights applied to the factors 
 
If the formula includes multiple factors, each factor must be weighted by a fraction so 
that the sum of these fractions does not exceed one. The exact weight to apply to each 
factor, however, is a matter of judgment. 
 
A straightforward way to choose the weights is to weight each factor equally. The 
Massachusetts formula, for example, weights each factor by one-third. UDITPA 
incorporated this formula in 1957 and, by 1977, this formula was the standard formula 
in all but one of the states with a corporate income tax (
25). 
 
Factor weights may also be chosen to weight the “production” and “marketing” sides 
equally. Thus, the property and payroll factors have a weight of one-fourth each and 
the sales factor have a weight of one-half.  
 
The Canadian provinces use a two-factor payroll and gross revenue formula and 
weight each factor by one-half. The provinces, therefore, apply equal weights to the 
production and marketing sides.  
 
Finally, if the apportionment formula uses value added at origin to represent the 
production side, the formula may include sales at destination to represent the 
marketing side. Weighting each factor equally will create a balance between the 
production and marketing locations, although the individual components of value 
added will not have equal weights. 
 
Other methods of assigning factor weights may be pursued. For example, the factors 
may be weighted according to the specific contribution each factor makes to overall 
profits. The profit-split methods employed at the international level use this approach 
(see OECD, 2001). The United States uses formulary methods in its advanced pricing 
agreement (APA) program for financial services firms involved in global trading (
26). 
Under these APAs, the firm splits its profits among locations using a formula based 
on a value factor, a risk factor and an activity factor. The factor definitions and 
weights applied to each factor are specific to each firm.  
 
                                                 
(
24) The Court added that doing so was the responsibility of the U.S. Congress. The Commerce clause 
expressly authorizes Congress to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations and among the several 
states".  
(
25) Peckron (1977) reported that 44 states and the District of Columbia used the three-factor formula in 
1977. Iowa was the only “recalcitrant” state to use a single-factor sales formula (some states did not 
levy a corporate income tax). The Supreme Court’s decision in 1978 validating the constitutionality of 
the single-factor sales formula may have triggered the move toward a formula with a relatively heavy 
weight on the sales factor. 
(
26) See Internal Revenue Service Notice 94-40, 1994-1 Cumulative Bulletin 351. In entering into these 
APAs, the IRS made it clear that it is not prescribing a method or factors that will necessarily apply in 
all APAs. Other methods or factors may be appropriate in other circumstances. - 20 - 
Standardized weights may be determined on an industry basis and then applied 
uniformly across industries. Finally, specific factor weights may be estimated using 
econometric analysis. For example, profits could be estimated as a function of the 
factors used in the formula, with the regression point estimates forming the basis for 
assigning the weights to each factor.  
 
2.2.5 Missing  factors  and  other  formulae 
 
A firm doing business in several locations may not have property, payroll, or gross 
receipts in each location. In such cases, if a state uses a multi-factor formula and one 
of the factors is “missing", then the taxpayer excludes that factor from the formula 
and averages the remaining factors by the total number of factors present and applies 
this formula to its total income. A factor will be missing only if both the numerator 
and the denominator are zero. If the numerator is zero within a state but the 
denominator is positive, then the factor remains in the formula.   
 
The Canadian provinces also apply a “missing factor” rule. If a corporation, for 
example, does not have gross revenue during a year, then its income will be allocated 
to the provinces according to the share of salaries and wages paid that year. 
 
Taxpayers may also use an alternative formula in certain cases. In most states, a 
taxpayer that might otherwise be required to use the standard apportionment formula 
may petition the state tax authority to use an alternate formula (or method). The new 
formula may drop a factor or modify the definition, for example, so that the formula 
may more accurately represent where the taxpayer has earned its income. UDITPA 
section 18 outlines these provisions. 
 
2.3  Definitions and locations of the factors  
 
The US states have adopted fairly similar definitions of the property, payroll and 
gross receipts factors as provided in UDITPA. In addition, the Multistate Tax 
Commission has developed allocation and apportionment regulations that provide 
further details on implementing UDITPA and other rules. The Canadian provinces 
have standard definitions of the payroll and gross receipts factors. The two countries 
measure each factor differently, as discussed below. Moreover, the individual US 
states also often modify the definitions of each factor to reflect particular state 




In the United States, the property factor includes real and tangible personal property 
owned or rented and used in the state during the tax period. Such property includes 
land, buildings, machinery, stocks of goods (inventory), equipment and other real and 
tangible personal property. The UDITPA property definition does not include 
intangible property, although some states include certain intangible property, such as 
computer software, in the property factor. - 21 - 
 
Owned tangible property is valued at its original cost averaged over the year. In 
general, original cost equals the basis of the property for federal income tax purposes 
at the time of acquisition, adjusted for certain capital improvements and deductions, 
but not for depreciation. Rented tangible property is capitalized at eight times its net 
annual rental rate. Special procedures apply if property is sub-rented. Inventory is 
generally valued according to its value for federal tax purposes. Some states require 
the taxpayer to use the values for real and tangible personal property reported on the 
taxpayer’s federal income tax return. 
 
Location of property 
 
As a general rule, real and tangible personal property is located in a state if the 
property is owned or rented and used in the state. Special rules apply concerning 
mobile and in-transit property, construction in progress, property in international 
waters, government-owned property and property that is temporarily not in use. For 
example, the numerator of the property factor may include mobile property according 





The US states generally measure payroll by employee compensation, which includes 
wages, salaries, commissions and any other form of remuneration paid or accrued to 
employees for personal services. This figure corresponds to the amounts for federal 
employment reporting purposes. In-kind compensation, such as the value of room and 
board, may also be included in the payroll factor if it would also be included in federal 
gross income. Payroll excludes payments made to independent contractors or to any 
person who is not classified as an employee, but it may include payments made to 
leased employees. Many states define an employee according to federal rules imposed 
for purposes of levying federal payroll taxes for unemployment benefits under the 
federal Model Unemployment Compensation Act.  
 
The Canadian payroll factor includes compensation and taxable benefits paid to 
employees of the corporation. Benefits are included in the payroll factor only if they 
are deductible by the corporation. Allocable salaries and wages do not include 
unemployment insurance contributions and pension plan contributions, nor do they 
include fees paid to directors who are not employees and commissions paid to persons 
who are not employees. However, fees paid to another person for services that would 
normally be performed by employees of the corporation are included in allocable 
salaries and wages.  
 
  Location of payroll 
 
The US states and Canadian provinces follow different procedures for assigning the 
location of payroll. In the states, if the employee performs the services entirely within 
the state, compensation is treated as if it had been paid in that state. If the employee 
performs services both within and outside the state, the following rules generally - 22 - 
apply. Compensation is deemed paid in a state if the employee’s base of operations is 
in the state, or, in cases where the employee has no base of operations, if the 
employee is directed or controlled from a location in the state. If neither condition 
holds, compensation will be attributed to the employee’s state of residence.  
 
The provinces generally assign salaries and wages to the permanent establishment 
where the employee normally reports to work. However, salaries and wages for head 
office administration are assigned to the location of the head office. 
 
 
2.3.2  Sales and gross receipts 
 
In the states, the sales and gross receipts factor generally includes gross receipts less 
returns and allowances from the sale of goods or products and gross receipts for 
services, interest, dividends, rentals, royalties, capital gains and other business 
income. In general, sales and gross receipts include all gross receipts that are not 
specifically allocated to a location. Thus, the definition of “sales” includes not only 
sales of goods but also all gross receipts derived in the regular course of trade or 
business. UDITPA defines “sales” as “gross receipts".  
 
For sales of other than tangible personal property, many states look to the income-
producing activities that create gross receipts. Income-producing activities generally 
mean the transactions and activities directly engaged in by the taxpayer in the regular 
course of trade or business. Under MTC regulations, an income-producing activity 
includes the use of tangible and intangible property by the taxpayer in performing a 
service; the sale, rental, leasing, licensing or other use of real property; the rental, 
leasing, licensing or other use of tangible personal property; and the sale, licensing, or 
other use of intangible personal property (
27). Thus, for intangible property, the sale, 
licensing or other use of intangible personal property is an income producing activity, 
whereas the mere holding of intangible personal property is not generally considered 
an income-producing activity. 
 
In the provinces, gross revenue includes revenue from any source that is not 
specifically excluded. Interest on bonds, debentures, or mortgages; dividends on 
shares of capital stock; and rentals or royalties from property that is not used in 
connection with the principal business operations of the corporation are excluded 
from gross revenue.  
 
In both Canada and the United States, gross receipts are net of any returns or 
discounts. Whereas Canada excludes from the sales factor any federal or provincial 
sales taxes collected, many US states include federal and state excise taxes if such 




                                                 
(
27) See MTC Reg. IV.17 Sales Factor: Sales Other Than Sales of Tangible Personal Property in This 
State and  (2) Income producing activity: defined. - 23 - 
Location of sales and gross receipts in the US states 
 
In the United States, most states assign tangible sales on a “destination basis", that is, 
to their ultimate destination, rather than on an “origin basis", that is, to the location of 
shipment or where the sale was negotiated. However, in cases where the sale is not 
taxable in the state of destination, many states deem the sale to have occurred in the 
state of origin, as discussed below. 
 
States generally assign sales of other than tangible personal property or gross receipts 
from intangible property to the location of the income-producing activity. If only part 
of that activity occurs within the state, gross receipts may be attributed to the state 
where the greater proportion of the income-producing activity is performed, based on 
costs of performance. In some cases, gross receipts may be attributed to a state 
according to the ratio of the time spent performing the personal services in the state to 
the total time spent performing the personal services everywhere.  
 
  The throwback rule 
 
Many states have adopted a throwback rule for sales of tangible personal property. 
Under the general throwback rule in UDITPA, sales of tangible personal property will 
be returned to the state of origin if the seller is not taxable in the state of the purchaser 
or if the sale is made to the US government. These sales are returned to the state from 
which the property was shipped, i.e., to the state of origin, and included in the 
numerator of that state’s sales factor.  
 
The throwback rule prevents the creation of “nowhere” income when sales are 
shipped to a location where they are not subject to tax. This situation may occur either 
because federal law prohibits the state from taxing the sale or because the seller may 




The throwback rule does not apply simply because a state chooses not to tax the sale. 
The sale will still be assigned to the destination state as long as that state has the 
jurisdiction to levy an income tax on the taxpayer regardless of whether the state, 
chooses to levy the tax.  
 
The throwout rule 
 
Many states assign gross receipts from the licensing or sale of patents, copyrights, or 
trademarks to the location where the intangible personal property is used. If the 
income-producing activity from intangible personal property can be readily identified, 
the income is included in the denominator of the sales factor and, if the income-
producing activity occurs in the state, in the numerator of the sales factor as well (
29). 
                                                 
(
28) Under Public Law No. 86-272, which was enacted in 1959, states may not levy an income tax on a 
non-resident company if its only connection with the state is soliciting orders for sales of tangible 
personal property sent from outside the state. This law applies only to taxes based on or measured by 
net income. 
(
29) See MTC Reg. IV.18.(c). Special rules: Sales Factor. - 24 - 
For example, if copyrighted material is printed in a state, the copyright is considered 
to be used and located in that state.   
 
By contrast, if the business income from intangible property cannot be readily 
attributed to any particular income-producing activity of the taxpayer, the income 
cannot be assigned to the numerator of the sales factor for any state and shall be 
excluded from the denominator of the sales factor. Thus, if business income in the 
form of dividends received on stock, royalties received on patents or copyrights, or 
interest received on bonds arises from the mere holding of the intangible personal 
property of the taxpayer, such dividends and interest shall be excluded entirely from 
the sales factor. 
 
  Location of sales and gross receipts in Canada  
 
Canada applies a destination-based rule that attributes gross revenue to the permanent 
establishment where the customer is located (
30). In general, the amount of income 
deemed earned in each province is the average of the share of gross revenue attributed 
to the permanent establishment in the province and salaries and wages paid in the year 
by the corporation to employees of the permanent establishment (
31). Gross revenue is 
assigned to the permanent establishment located at the destination point of the 
merchandise shipment. 
 
Determining whether the taxpayer has a permanent establishment in a province is a 
question of fact and depends on the circumstances of each case. For example, a 
corporation’s subsidiary in a province or a subsidiary engaged in a trade or business in 
a province does not, by itself, constitute a permanent establishment of the corporation. 
A corporation that has a fixed place of business in a province will have a permanent 
establishment in that province, but it may also have a permanent establishment in 
other cases, such as if it carries on business through an agent in the province. 
However, a corporation that does all of its business from a source outside of the 
province through mail order and catalogue sales and does not have a stock of goods in 
the provinces usually will not have a permanent establishment in that province. 
 
If the taxpayer does not have a permanent establishment in the province or country 
where the customer is located, then the provinces employ a type of "throw back" rule. 
In the first instance, the sale will be assigned, or thrown back, to the permanent 
establishment where the person negotiating the sale is attached. 
 
The rule changes slightly if the destination of a merchandise shipment is to a country 
other than Canada where the taxpayer does not have a permanent establishment. In 
this case, if the activity occurred in a single province, the revenue is assigned to the 
province where the merchandise was produced or manufactured. If the merchandise 
was produced or manufactured in several provinces, then the gross revenue is 
assigned to each province according to the salaries and wages paid to employees at 
each of the locations where the taxpayer has a permanent establishment involved in 
the production or manufacture of the merchandise.  
                                                 
(
30) I am grateful to Jack Mintz for assistance with this section. 
(
31) See Regulation 402 for detailed rules on the allocation of gross revenue. - 25 - 
 
Another rule applies in certain cases concerning sales made to customers in countries 
other than Canada. In these cases, if the taxpayer has a permanent establishment in the 
other country but the corporation is not subject to taxation on its income under the 
laws of that foreign country or through application of a tax treaty, the sale is exempt 
from Canadian taxation. 
  
 
2.4 Sector-specific  formulae   
2.4.1 Manufacturing  and  mercantile  industries 
 
The general apportionment formula used in the US states employs a combination of 
property, payroll and gross receipts for manufacturing and merchandising. The 
general apportionment formula in the Canadian provinces employs gross revenue and 
salaries and wages for manufacturing and merchandising. 
 
2.4.2 Other  sectors 
 
The traditional formula may not be appropriate for all industries, however, as it may 
not necessarily reflect the factors that generate income for those industries. Both the 
US states and Canadian provinces apply specific formulae for other industries to 
reflect their particular industrial structure.  
 
Special apportionment formulae generally apply for construction contractors, airlines, 
railroads, trucking companies, television and radio broadcasting, financial institutions 
and publishing. 
 
Some states have also adopted specialized apportionment rules for other industries, 
including courier and package delivery services, telecommunication companies, 
pipeline companies, shippers, franchisors, film producers, securities brokers, 
professional sport teams, insurance companies, mutual funds and the fishing industry. 
In addition, the states allow a taxpayer to petition to use an alternative formula if the 
prescribed formula is inappropriate. 
 
In some cases, a taxpayer that has several businesses that would use different 
formulae would use the formula appropriate for the sector in which it earns the 
majority of its gross receipts. In Illinois, for example, if a single corporation’s 
business is composed of both manufacturing and the provision of transportation 
services, it uses the appropriate formula for the predominant area of its business to 
apportion the income of the entire business.  
 
In other cases, separate businesses use separate formulae. For example, California has 
developed a procedure for calculating an apportionment formula for a unitary business 
that includes a general corporation and its financial subsidiaries. In this case, the 
property factor includes a share of the receivables of the general corporation and the 
intangible property of the financial corporation at 20 percent of its face value. As - 26 - 
Miller (1995) explains, the 20 percent figure was derived from the relationship 
between the value of the property of financial and of other industries. 
 
In Canada, special allocation formulas apply for nine different industries --- insurance 
corporations, banks, trust and loan corporations, railway corporations, airline 
corporations, grain elevator operators, bus and truck operators, ship operators and 
pipeline operators. These formulae generally reflect a particular feature of that 
industry. The formula for pipeline operators, for example, replaces the sales factor 
with a factor reflecting the miles of pipeline in the province. For airlines, a fixed asset 
cost factor replaces the payroll factor and a revenue plane miles flown factor replaces 
the sales factor. Insurance corporations allocate solely on the share of net premiums 
earned in the province to total net premiums earned. Chartered banks allocate on the 
basis of salaries and wages paid to employees of its permanent establishments in the 
province plus aggregate loans and deposits of its permanent establishments in the 





3.  THE COMPANY GROUP 
 
Determining the contours of the company group is a central issue in adopting group 
taxation within the EU. Various tests are consistent with “group” taxation, including 
tests based on ownership shares, as under consolidation, to tests based on the 
economic connections and relationships among affiliated entities and their parent 
companies, as under unitary combination. This section describes some of these tests. 
 
3.1   Consolidation and combination  
 
Consolidation of legally separate entities and combination of economically unitary 
entities share many features. Both approaches create a company “group” for tax 
purposes. Thus, both approaches can reduce the need to price internal transfers and 
can eliminate withholding taxes levied on internal payments of dividends, interest, 
royalties, etc., among related corporations. Both approaches also provide for loss 
offsetting between affiliated entities. 
Despite some similarities, however, consolidation differs significantly from 
combination. For example, whereas meeting a legal ownership threshold is generally 
sufficient to determine whether entities may be consolidated into a single taxable 
group, meeting a legal ownership threshold may be a necessary, but is generally not a 
sufficient, condition to include an entity in the unitary group. To be included in the 
unitary group, the related entities must be economically integrated or have economic 
interdependencies. To be included in the consolidated group, however, the related 
entities need not have any economic inter-relationships, as long as the entities meet 
the ownership threshold.  
 - 27 - 
Consolidation may be interpreted as a group of entities linked by legal ownership 
while combination may be interpreted as a group of entities linked by economic 
ownership (with perhaps a legal ownership element as well). The consolidated and the 
combined group may be identical, but this need not be the case.  
 
Neither consolidation nor (unitary) combination is required to implement a formulary 
apportionment system. For example, since Canada does not allow consolidation, the 
Canadian provinces apply formulary allocation on a separate entity basis. Thus, a 
company headquartered in one province and doing business through legally separate 
subsidiaries in other provinces will not be subject to formulary apportionment. 
 
The United States allows consolidation for federal tax purposes. However, although 
all of the states that tax corporate income use formulary apportionment to distribute 
the income of a corporation doing business across the states through multiple 
divisions, only about one-third of the states receive use of the formulary method to 
legally separate entities that form a unitary business. Table 1 lists the states that apply 
mandatory combination. In 2004, sixteen states require unitary combination. 
 
3.2  Definitions of the group  
 
In considering consolidated base or group taxation with formulary apportionment 
within the EU, it is important to define the group in a way that is feasible, practical 
and administrable. While consolidation is a simple choice and possibly the most 
logical and practical choice for now, there are many reasons to consider how the 
unitary business principle addresses critical tax issues. This section discusses some of 
the group definitions that the US states have implemented. 
 
3.2.1  Consolidation based on ownership or control 
 
A simple way to define a group would be to include all affiliates that exceed a certain 
ownership level within the group. Companies that file on a consolidated basis would 
then pay tax based on consolidated group income, adjusted for net operating losses 
and certain intercompany transactions. 
 
In the US state context, Corrigan (1980) suggested that majority ownership of one 
corporation by another should be sufficient to define the group. This test would 
eliminate the subjectivity that can arise in trying to determine whether internal 
transactions are sufficiently integrated to create a unitary business. Combining or 
consolidating affiliates based on ownership would generally avoid the “facts-and-
circumstances” tests arise when defining a unitary business. Musgrave (1984) also 
argued that a 50-percent ownership test would “likely go a long way toward 
determining apportionable units” and would seem to resolve most of the difficult 
problems that arise in determining the company group.  
 
Although there are advantages to an ownership test, defining the company group (or 
the taxable group) solely on an ownership basis ignores the fact that a group of related 
but less than majority-owned companies could nevertheless be very highly - 28 - 
economically integrated. This economic integration may encourage the taxpayer to 
modify intercompany transactions or alter the corporate tax structure solely for tax 
purposes.  
 
McLure (1984) provided an economist’s view on defining a unitary business 
according to consolidation rules. He stated that “although there may be much to be 
said for such a straightforward rule from the point of view of simplicity, certainty and 
uniformity, from an economic point of view (majority) ownership is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for the existence of a unitary business".   This line of thinking echoes 
the Supreme Court’s argument in Mobil that “Superficially, intercorporate division 
might appear to be a[n] . . . attractive basis for limiting apportionability. But the form 
of business organization may have nothing to do with the underlying unity or diversity 
of business enterprise" (
32). 
 
3.2.2 Unitary  business  definitions 
 
A number of states define the taxable group according to economic integration rather 
than legal integration. The unitary business idea views all of the elements of a single 
trade or business as a single unit. This concept extends beyond legal ownership or 
control to examine the degree of operational or economic integration or dependency 
among related entities. Under the unitary business concept, the scope of the “unitary 
business” is first defined and then the income of that unitary business is apportioned 
using a formula based on the activities of the members of the unitary group in each 
jurisdiction. 
 
A key reason to apply unitary combination arises when the technologically and 
economically integrated elements of a multiple-entity business form a single “unitary” 
business and these links among the various members of the firm make it difficult, if 
not impossible, to identify the profits attributable to each of them. These links may 
include economies of scale, economies of scope and shared management, research and 
development and other costs. As a result, the joint profits of the firm are higher for the 
group than they would be if the members of the group acted as independent entities 
and it is not possible to split the joint profits among the members of the firm. 
Therefore, the related members of the firm must be treated as a single “unitary” 
business. 
 
Use of the unitary method, which was developed in California, accelerated when the 
California Supreme Court held that once a business is found to be unitary then the 
state statutes require it to use formulary apportionment (
33). In these cases, the 
California Court ruled that the state could not require a taxpayer to use separate 
accounting if the taxpayer was a unitary business.  
 
A US Supreme Court ruling reinforced this notion two decades later stating that “the 
linchpin of apportionability in the field of state income taxation is the unitary business 
                                                 
(
32) See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980). 
(
33) See Superior Oil Co. v. Franchise Tax Board, 60 Cal. 2d 417 (1963) and Honolulu Oil Co. v. 
Franchise Tax Board, 60 Cal. 2d 406 (1963). In these cases, the taxpayers requested unitary treatment 
over the tax authority’s position that the companies should file on a separate accounting basis. - 29 - 
principle” (
34). Although the Supreme Court has frequently dealt with unitary business 
issues, it has not established a ‘bright line’ definition of a unitary business. 
 
The states have enacted a range of unitary business definitions. The US Supreme 
Court has accepted this situation, stating that “A final point that needs to be made 
about the business concept is that it is not, so to speak, unitary: there are variations on 
the theme and any number of them are logically consistent with the underlying 
principles motivating the approach” (
35). This section discusses various ways of 
defining a unitary business. 
 
  Unity of ownership, operation and use 
 
California has used formulary apportionment since adopting the corporate income tax 
in 1929. As Miller (1984) explains, the state tax authorities proposed the combined 
report procedure in the 1930s to prevent improper profit shifting out of state. 
 
The California Supreme Court articulated the “three unities” test in its Butler Bros. 
decision: 
 
“[I]t is in our opinion that the unitary nature of the appellant’s 
business is definitely established by the presence of the following 
circumstances:  (1) unity of ownership, (2) unity of operation as 
evidenced by central purchasing, advertising, accounting and 
management divisions and (3) unity of use in its centralized 
executive force and general system of operation” (
36). 
 
Unity of ownership exists if a single taxpayer owns, directly or indirectly, a majority 
of the voting stock of two or more corporations. Unity of operation arises inter alia 
from common purchases, centralized advertising and record keeping, common legal 
representation and intercompany financing. Unity of use is found by not only a flow 
of goods, but also by shared management and information, common knowledge and 
expertise, etc. 
 
Based on the finding that the business was unitary, the Court rejected the company’s 
request to use separate accounting, arguing that a company may use separate 
accounting only when it can segregate income clearly and accurately. The Court 
found that it would be impossible to achieve this outcome for the company’s 
integrated interstate operations. 
 
  Dependency or contribution 
 
The rationale for extending the unitary business to encompass multiple entities derives 
from the argument that the operation of the business within the state depends on or 
                                                 
(
34) See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 445 U.S. 425 (1980). The Supreme Court later expressed the 
view that “The existence of a unitary relation between payee and payor is one justification for 
apportionment, but not the only one". Allied-Signal v. Director, Division of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768 
(1992). For an analysis, see Hellerstein (1993). 
(
35)  See Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159 (1983). 
(
36) See Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 17 Cal. 2d 664 (1941). - 30 - 
contributes to the operation of the business outside of the state, regardless of the 
corporate structure. As Altman and Keesling (1946) argued, “The essential test is 
whether or not the operation of the portion of the business within the state is 
dependent upon or contributory to the operation of the business outside the state. If 
there is such a relationship, the business is unitary” (
37). This relationship does not 
depend on whether the entity is organized as a branch or as a subsidiary. Thus, there is 
no reason to limit the combined report to divisions of a single corporation. 
 
With its ruling in Edison Stores, the California Supreme Court validated the extension 
of the unitary business concept to activities conducted by a multi-corporate group (
38). 
As Miller (1984) explained: “This approach [combined reporting] was justified under 
the rationale of the formula itself, which looked to the activities of a business that 
took place beyond a state’s boundaries in determining the amount of income 
attributable to the state. If this approach could be used with state boundaries, then it 
should be equally applicable to corporate boundaries as long as a single business was 
involved".   
 
Operational unity and economic unity 
 
Keesling and Warren (1960) presented the dual notions of “operational unity” and 
“economic unity” as relationships that help determine the existence of a unitary 
business (
39). Operational unity encompasses a business that is vertically integrated. 
For example, an entity that operates a mine in one state, where it extracts, processes 
and sells ore, while it maintains its headquarters company in another state, where it 
performs management, financing and accounting functions can be described as 
operating a unitary business. Economic unity exists when two or more activities that 
are distinct from an operational standpoint should nevertheless be considered as a 
unitary business because of the economic interrelationships that exist. 
 
Basic operational interdependence 
 
To help establish some order to the unitary business notion, Jerome Hellerstein (1968) 
suggested limiting a unitary business to its interdependent basic operating functions. 
He argued that “there is no viable way” to separate the profits of a business whose 
independent operating functions are carried on in more than one state. As Hellerstein 
(1982) later noted, “the basic operational interdependence requirement employs a 
badly needed objective test of a unitary business".  He also suggested imposing a 
substantiality requirement of one-fourth to one-third of the flow of goods or services 
among controlled corporations. 
 
Under a test that examines operational integration, non-operational functions, such as 
centralized management, financing, advertising, the use of patents, trademarks and 
expertise and other ancillary or supportive activities, would not indicate the existence 
of a unitary business. Hellerstein specifically rejected the notion that non-operating 
functions, such as legal counseling and fiscal control, could be examined to find a 
                                                 
(
37) This book has strongly influenced the development of the unitary business concept in the states. 
(
38) See Edison California Stores v. McColgan 30 Cal.2d.472 (1947). 
(
39) Peters (1999) refers to the combined report method as the “brainchild” of Frank Keesling. Keesling 
counsel to the California Franchise Tax Board at the time. - 31 - 
unitary business. In his view, standard accounting methods could be employed to 
distribute the costs of centralized operations across the unitary business. He also 
argued that providing a rather narrow definition of a unitary business would better 
avoid legal controversy, extraterritorial taxation and excess compliance costs, than 




McLure (1983, 1984) suggested defining the unitary group according to its economic 
interdependencies. He defined a three-stage test for determining whether an entity 
should be included in the unitary group. First, for a unitary business to exist, the entity 
must be under common control via ownership or management. Second, there must be 
shared expenses, economies of scale or scope, intragroup transactions, vertical 
integration, or other economic interdependencies. Third, these economic 
interdependencies must be so substantial that it is not possible to divide profits 
properly among the group members. This latter condition is necessary to prevent 
commonly controlled affiliated firms from being included in the unitary group if they 
have only insignificant economic relations with the group. 
 
According to McLure, economic interdependence is the critical element of a unitary 
business. Economic interdependencies among commonly controlled members make it 
‘conceptually impossible’ to determine the income of the individual members. An 
economic interdependence test would allow a unitary business to encompass not only 
the production and marketing elements of a business that created a flow of goods, but 
also the management and holding company elements that created a flow of value. 
 
Flow of value  
 
In 1984 in Container Corp., the Supreme Court addressed the scope of a unitary 
business. Specifically, the Court considered whether the Container Corporation and its 
affiliates doing business in the paperboard packaging industry constituted a unitary 
business. The company, explaining that it had minimal operational interdependence 
with its subsidiaries, proposed that the Court adopt a “substantial flow of goods” as a 
bright-line rule for characterizing a mercantile or manufacturing enterprise as unitary 
business. The Court rejected this argument, noting that although substantial mutual 
interdependence can arise through a substantial flow of goods, a flow of goods is not 
the only way to create such interdependence. The Court explained that “The 
prerequisite to a constitutionally acceptable finding of a unitary business is a flow of 
value, not a flow of goods” (
40). This presence of a flow of value supplemented earlier 
rulings that a unitary business exhibits “contributions to income resulting from 
functional integration, centralization of management and economies of scale” (
41).  
                                                 
(
40) See Container Corp. 463 U.S. 159 (1983) at 178 n. 17 (emphasis in the original), citing McLure 
(1983). Based on the Supreme Court’s focus on the importance of the economic interdependencies over 
operational interdependence in unitary analysis, Walter Hellerstein (2004) concludes: “It is not an 
overstatement to say that the contemporary constitutional definition of a unitary business is rooted in 
the work of Charles McLure".  
(
41) See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vt. 445 US 425 (1980), F.W. Woolworth Co. v. 
Taxation and Revenue Dept. of the State of New Mexico 458 U.S. 354 (1982) and Allied Signal v. 
Director, Taxation Division 504 U.S 768 (1992). - 32 - 
 
The Court also noted that the fact that the results obtained under separate accounting 
differed from those under apportionment had no bearing on the acceptability of the 
apportionment results. It explained that the separate accounting method is “based on 
precisely the sort of formal geographical accounting whose basic theoretical 
weaknesses justify resort to formulary apportionment in the first place". The Court 
had earlier indicated that the “The principal virtue of the unitary business principle of 
taxation is that it does a better job of accounting for ‘the many subtle and largely 
unquantifiable transfers of value that take place among the components of a single 
enterprise’ than, for example, geographical or transactional accounting”. 
 
 
4. THE TAX BASE 
4.1  The taxable connection or nexus  
 
A company must have a sufficient connection or nexus with a jurisdiction before it 
becomes subject to that jurisdiction’s tax system. This connection can arise in many 
ways, from the company’s physical presence to its “intangible” presence in the 
jurisdiction.  
 
4.1.1 Physical  presence 
 
For sales and use taxes in the US states, the US Supreme Court has established a 
physical presence test as necessary for the taxpayer to be subject to that state’s sales 
and use taxes. In these cases, the Court has ruled that a state may not collect sales and 
use taxes on sales made in the state by an out-of-state entity if the entity’s only 
connection with the state is to solicit orders that it fills from outside the state (
42). 
 
Some state courts have ruled that a physical presence is also required for income 
taxes. For example, a New Jersey court found that substantial nexus requires the 
physical presence of a taxpayer or its employees in the state (
43). The state court based 
its reasoning, in part, on the desire to maintain uniformity between the nexus test for 
sales and use tax purposes and for income tax purposes. 
 
4.1.2 Intangible  presence 
 
In contrast to the physical presence requirement for sales and use taxes, there is no 
such requirement for the state income and franchise tax. As Jerome Hellerstein (1995) 
explained, the Supreme Court has “made it clear that the presence of the recipient of 
                                                 
(
42) See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S.Ct. 1904 (1992). Although the taxpayer’s activities met the 
minimum connection requirements under Due Process, these connections were not sufficient to meet 
Commerce Clause requirements. See also National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue 386 
U.S. 753 (1967). 
(
43) See Lanco, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation, 21 NJ Tax 200 (2003). - 33 - 
income from intangible property in a state is not essential to the state’s income tax on 
income of a non-resident". Instead, a state may tax a non-resident on its income that 
arises from the use of the intangible property in the state. This principle was 
illuminated in 1993 when a South Carolina state court established that the out-of-state 
company’s trademark licensing arrangement with the in-state related company created 
a substantial nexus with that out-of-state trademark holding company (
44).  
 
In reviewing state tax cases since that decision, Hellerstein and Hellerstein (1998, 
cum. Sup 2004), find a range of views on whether physical presence is required for 
income tax purposes. They conclude that even though these views are mixed, the 
majority of reactions across the country to the Geoffrey ruling support the proposition 
that physical presence is not required for income taxes. 
 
4.1.3 Permanent  establishment 
 
In the international arena, the permanent establishment rule generally determines 
whether a taxpayer has a sufficient connection with a jurisdiction to be subject to that 
jurisdiction’s tax system. The Permanent Establishment article (Article 5) of the 
OECD Model Convention sets forth a series of tests for determining whether an 
enterprise has a fixed place of business through which it carries on its business and, 
thus, whether the enterprise has a permanent establishment. These tests include a 
place of management, an office, a branch, a factory and so forth. These tests require a 
physical presence for a permanent establishment to exist (
45). 
 
The Commentary to Article 5 also makes it clear that a business that merely sells into 
another country without having any other connection to the country will generally not 
have a permanent establishment in that country and, thus, will not have a taxable 
presence. Moreover, since it is a legally separate entity, the existence of a subsidiary 
company does not, by itself, create a permanent establishment for the parent company. 
 
4.2  Treatment of specific items of income  
 
The distinction between income earned as part of the ongoing business and income 
earned as an incidental part of the business exists at both the national and sub-national 
levels. At the national level, tax laws and treaty provisions generally establish the tax 
treatment of these items. These laws treat some items as “business profits” and other 
items, such as dividends, interest and royalties, as “passive” income. At the sub-
national level, most US states distinguish between “business” income that is 
apportionable across locations and “non-business” income that is allocable to a 
specific location.  
 
                                                 
(
44) See Geoffrey Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 437 S.E. 2d (1993). 
(
45) For the convention, see OECD (1998). The OECD (2004) is evaluating issues concerning profits 
attributable to a permanent establishment. - 34 - 
4.2.1  Business and non-business income 
 
Most states have adopted UDITPA, either in whole or in part, which outlines the basic 
rules for dividing income. Section 9 of Article IV of UDITPA indicates that business 
income shall be apportioned using an equally weighted property, payroll and sales 
formula. Sections 4 to 8 of Article IV provide specific rules for allocating non-
business income, including rents and royalties from real or tangible personal property, 
capital gains and losses, interest, dividends and patent or copyright royalties. In some 
cases, the items of income are allocated to the taxpayer’s commercial domicile, while 
in other cases, the items of income are allocated to the location of the physical 
property or to the location where the intangible property is used.  
 
Business income generally means income arising from transactions and activity in the 
regular course of the taxpayer’s trade or business. It includes income from tangible 
and intangible property if the acquisition, management and disposition of the property 
constitute integral parts of the taxpayer’s regular trade or business operations.  
 
In addition to the rules outlined in UDITPA, regulations issued by the MTC provide 
guidance on how to determine whether income is business income. For example, 
income derived from property that forms an integral, functional or operative 
component of the taxpayer’s trade or business operations is business income. Income 
from intangible property is business income if the intangible property serves an 
operational function rather than solely an investment function (
46). 
 
Once business income has been identified, all other income is treated as non-business 
income. In general, income is presumed to be business income unless it is clearly 
identifiable as non-business income.  
  
The states follow a variety of approaches to distinguish between the two types of 
income. For example, capital gain on the sale of stock might be classified as business 
income if the stock formed part of the business while it might be classified as non-
business income if the investment was not related to the main business. In the former 
case, the gain would be apportioned over all locations where the company did 
business. In the latter case, the entire gain would be allocated to a single location for 




4.3 Territorial  scope   
4.3.1  The European Union’s Water’s Edge 
 
The idea under consideration in the EU would create a company tax system that 
encompasses only the income and operations within the territorial boundaries, or the 
“water’s edge", of the European Union. The term “water’s edge” derives from the 
                                                 
(
46) See Reg. IV.1. (a). Business and Nonbusiness Income Defined in Multistate Tax Commission, 
Allocation and Apportionment Regulations, updated September 2003. 
(
47) See Hellerstein (2001) for an evaluation of some of the difficulties that arise in distinguishing 
between apportionable and allocable income. - 35 - 
practices in the US states of generally restricting the combined group to companies (or 
parts of companies) that have income subject to tax by the US federal government(
48). 
 
The states with water's edge combined reporting generally exclude foreign 
subsidiaries from the group and generally follow federal rules regarding the treatment 
of international income. In many states, for example, the amount of income included 
in the “water’s edge” is the amount reported for federal income tax purposes. Some 
states allow taxpayers to apply combined reporting on a worldwide basis. 
 
The water’s edge restriction is a key element of the EU proposal. This restriction is 
imposed to meet the objective of minimizing compliance costs, facilitating 
investments in the EU and respecting bilateral and international agreements between 
the EU Member States and non-EU countries. Limiting the system to operations 
within the European Union is politically practical, as well, since imposing this 
limitation avoids re-opening the controversies that surrounded the use of a worldwide 




As an example of the practical effect of the water’s edge limitation, Justice Powell, 
writing for the dissent in Container,  argued that double taxation arises because 
“California has rejected accepted international practice in favour of a tax structure that 
is fundamentally different in its basic assumptions” and that makes double taxation 
inevitable. The dissent suggested that the international outcry over the unitary method 
could be eliminated if the states used the income reported for federal tax purposes as 
the group income (
50). Since the taxpayer calculates this amount under international 
rules, i.e., the arm’s length method, the practice would be consistent with both 
international practice and federal policy.  
 
To some extent, European opposition to unitary combination was driven by litigation 
concerning California’s application of worldwide combined reporting to foreign-
based parent companies (
51). This opposition, which was expressed during Container 
and Barclays Bank, was based primarily on the argument that the state system of 
worldwide unitary combination and formulary apportionment was imposed 
“unilaterally” and was “incompatible” with the international system of arm’s length 
pricing (
52). In acknowledging the importance of this international opposition, the US 
Supreme Court noted that a “battalion of foreign governments” had “marched to 
                                                 
(
48) State definitions of the water’s edge are not uniform. 
(
49) In addition to the fact that the states applied the unitary method unilaterally, another reason for the 
controversy may have been because, apart from non-discrimination, US income tax treaties do not 
cover state taxes. Thus, they do not address any double taxation conflicts that may arise from the 
interaction of the formulary method used at the state level and the separate accounting method used at 
the international level.  
(
50) See Footnote 1 in the dissent to Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159 (1983). 
(
51) See Weiner (2001) for details on the Barclays controversy. The author worked on these issues 
while an economist in the Office of Tax Analysis at the Treasury Department. See also Barclays Bank 
PLC v. Franchise Tax Board of California, 512 U.s. 298 (1994). 
(
52) A key difference between the two cases is that Container concerned a US-based parent corporation 
while Barclay’s concerned a foreign-based parent corporation. In Container, the Supreme Court had 
deferred the issue of whether worldwide unitary combined reporting would be constitutionally 
acceptable with respect to a foreign-based parent company. See the Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations (1983) for examples of letters from foreign governments objecting to state 
worldwide combined reporting. - 36 - 
Barclays’ aid, deploring worldwide combined reporting in diplomatic notes, amicus 
briefs and even retaliatory legislation".  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ruled that 
the states are constitutionally allowed to apply the unitary method to the worldwide 
operations of a foreign-based company. By the time the Court issued its opinion, 
however, all of the states had adopted measures that would allow foreign-based (and 
US-based) unitary groups to limit the scope of the unitary group to US operations. 
Thus, the controversy had already been effectively resolved and the international 
opposition to global formulary apportionment essentially vanished.  
 
Although all of the states moved away from mandatory worldwide combination, many 
of them retained worldwide combination as an option (
53). For example, in 1993, the 
California legislature had proposed making water’s edge combined reporting 
mandatory, but eventually made water’s edge reporting optional in response to 
business interest in preserving the ability to file on a worldwide combined basis. 
 
4.3.2  Treatment of foreign-source income 
 
The EU water’s edge system could either exempt foreign-source income, as under an 
exemption or territorial system, or it could include the income and provide a tax credit 
for foreign income taxes paid on that income, as in a credit or worldwide system. Both 
the exemption and the credit systems have their advantages and disadvantages and an 
analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
The treatment of foreign-source dividends became particularly controversial in the 
United States in the early 1980s as the states began moving away from worldwide 
combined reporting to water’s edge combined reporting (
54). The controversy centered 
on the difficulties in creating a “competitive balance” between purely domestic 
enterprises and domestic- and foreign-based multinational enterprises concerning the 
treatment of intercompany dividend payments. 
 
If the corporate income tax levied at the sub-national level is considered a source-
based tax, then foreign-source dividends should be excluded from EU taxable income. 
As McLure (1986) explains, income that is attributable to a foreign source should not 
be subject to a source-based corporate income tax. To be consistent with basic income 
tax principles, if foreign-source dividends are tax exempt, then the expenses related to 
that income should not be tax deductible. Generally speaking, any expenses used to 
finance tax exempt income should not be tax deductible.   
 
                                                 
(
53) See McLure and Weiner (2000, pp. 256-66) for a summary of state legislative response’s 
concerning worldwide combined reporting. Expanding the scope of the unitary group to worldwide 
operations has two effects in a state. On the one hand, total income increases, but on the other hand, the 
share of income apportioned to the state decreases. The first effect will arise, however, only if foreign 
operations are profitable. When foreign operations make losses, the state tax liability will be lower 
under worldwide unitary combination than under domestic unitary combination. Given these offsetting 
effects, it is not surprising that Weiner (1994) found an ambiguous effect on investment in states that 
abandoned worldwide unitary combination.  
(
54) Part of the controversy related to whether the apportionment formula included the factors that 
generated that income. See United States Department of the Treasury (1984) for a detailed discussion. - 37 - 
4.3.3  Profit shifting under water’s edge reporting 
 
Any system that is limited to income and operations located only within the EU must 
devise methods to deal with transactions that occur outside the EU. Limiting the 
system to the EU’s territorial boundaries, i.e., the EU water’s edge, means that 
companies with income and operations outside the EU will apply two tax systems: 
The separate accounts system would determine the division of income between the 
EU and the rest of the world while the formulary apportionment with group taxation 
system would distribute the income among the individual Member States. Not only 
would multinational enterprises have to apply two tax systems, tax authorities would 
also have to implement and monitor the two systems. Addressing these issues is 
crucial, since a significant number of transactions by EU-based multinationals occur 
with non-EU parent companies or subsidiaries.  
 
Preventing improper profit shifting outside of the EU water’s edge (EUWE) would 
likely require maintaining and supplementing the anti-avoidance rules in the company 
tax laws of the EU Member States. The current rules include restrictions on foreign-
source income exemption, earnings stripping rules and anti-avoidance legislation. 
Subsidiaries that are included in the EUWE group would continue to file tax returns 
with the non-EU tax authorities with respect to their income arising outside of the EU. 
 
McLure and Weiner (2000) explain that EU water’s edge formulary apportionment 
with group taxation would prevent multinational enterprises from using transfer 
pricing to shift income to low-tax jurisdictions within the European Union. However, 
as long as the system is limited to the EU, separate accounting and arm’s length 
pricing would continue to prevail with income and transactions that occurred outside 
that area.  
 
McIntyre, Mines and Pomp (2001) stress that anti-avoidance rules would be necessary 
to prevent companies from using foreign holding companies to avoid tax. Application 
of these rules might bring some foreign source income into the EU water’s edge.  
 
Many states have adopted specific anti-avoidance rules to prevent improper income 
shifting. Some states, for example, apply federal section 482 rules to transactions 
between entities included in the water’s edge group and entities excluded from the 
water’s edge group. Some states may include certain types of foreign income in the 
water’s edge report. For example, water’s edge combined reports in California may 
include a portion of the income and apportionment factors of foreign subsidiaries with 
subpart F income (
55). To combat tax avoidance, operations located in tax havens may 
also be included within the water’s edge report. Montana, for example, requires 
taxpayers that make a water’s edge election to include the income and apportionment 
factors of any unitary subsidiaries incorporated in certain tax havens. Any taxable 
income shifted to a tax haven is considered income subject to apportionment.  
 
                                                 
(
55) California’s revenue and tax code has encompassed the specific IRC section 482 language since 
adopting the water’s edge provisions effective in 1988 and this language states that the California tax 
authorities must follow federal rules and regulations pursuant to Section 482 for income years 
beginning in 1988. See Franchise Tax Board (2002a, 2002b). - 38 - 
 
5. ECONOMIC  CONSEQUENCES   
 
This section discusses some of the economic consequences of using a system of 
formulary apportionment with group taxation, beginning with a review of the 
empirical and theoretical evidence in the academic literature followed by a discussion 
of corporate tax planning opportunities and government responses. The section also 
briefly discusses potential effects of using adjusted value added at origin as an 
apportionment factor. While many of these empirical results would not arise in a 
system with a uniform base and formula, the results are presented to help provide 




5.1  Effects on investment and employment  
 
In recent years, many states have moved away from the Massachusetts formula 
toward a formula with a relatively heavy weight on the sales factor. One explanation 
for this move is that states may have recognized that the traditional formula acts like 
an implicit excise tax levied on property and payroll. Thus, it may discourage 
investment and employment in the state.  
 
To avoid this outcome, many states have reduced the weight on the origin-based 
property and payroll factors in favor of increasing the weight on the destination-based 
sales factor. Empirical evidence suggests that this strategy stimulates new investment 
or employment. For example, using state data from 1983 to 1990, Gupta and 
Hofmann (2003) found that investment in a state fell as the tax burden on capital 
increased. They defined the tax burden on capital as the product of the tax rate and the 
weight on the property factor. The authors caution, however, that although the tax 
policy variables have a statistically significant influence, their economic significance 
“appears almost negligible", implying that the impact of state corporate income tax 
policy may be smaller than policy makers expect. 
 
Using a first-difference specification, Weiner (1994) estimated how state changes in 
the apportionment formula between 1982 and 1990 affected investment spending. She 
found that states can stimulate additional investment by reducing the weight on the 
property factor, all else equal. In constructing the relevant state apportionment tax 
rates, Weiner took into account the tax rate, the factor weight and the availability of 
federal tax deductibility in each state. Since the apportionment tax rate includes the 
rate and the weight, a reduction in the weight accompanied by an increase in the rate 
may have no influence on the apportionment rate. During the 1980s, many states 
raised the statutory tax rate at the same time that they moved to the double-weighted 
sales formula. The federal rate also affects the effective state apportionment tax rate. 
States that allow federal tax deductibility will have a lower effective tax rate relative 
to states that do not allow the deduction. However, this advantage will diminish as the 
federal tax rate falls. During the period of analysis, the federal rate fell from 48 
                                                 
(
56) McLure (2002b) discusses some problems that arise from the non-uniformity of U.S. state taxes. - 39 - 
percent to 34 percent, meaning that the states that allowed federal deductibility had a 
tax increase, all else equal, relative to the other states. 
 
Other authors have examined how changes in the formula affect employment. Using 
panel data from 1978 through 1994, Goolsbee and Maydew (2000) found that states 
that reduced the weight on the payroll factor experienced significantly greater 
employment in the manufacturing sector. However, since employment losses in other 
states offset these employment gains, they concluded that the country as a whole 
would be better off with a uniform formula than with competing formulae.  
 
Some authors have examined how states respond when other states change their 
formulae. Omer and Shelley (2001) investigate how subnational competition for 
mobile business capital, employment and sales leads state governments to engage in 
an “apportionment” competition with other states. As states experience revenue losses 
due to the changes in apportionment formulae in competing states, they respond by 




In a study conducted on a panel of Canadian provincial data, Weiner (1994) examined 
the effects on a multi-provincial firm’s demand for labor and capital investment in a 
system that applies a uniform formula but allows provinces to vary tax rates and tax 
credits. The estimates show that tax policy is highly effective at the provincial level. 
Provincial reductions in the cost of capital or in the statutory tax rate tend to increase 
investment. The influence of changes in the cost of capital became particularly 
noticeable after investment incentives were introduced for the manufacturing sector in 
the 1970s.  
 
The analysis also showed that the provinces use tax policy to compete with one 
another for investment. Provinces that reduce the tax burden on manufacturing 
investment stimulate new investment, holding tax rates and tax credits in competing 
provinces fixed.  
 
Tax planning also arises within the relatively uniform Canadian formulary 
apportionment system. Since Canada does not allow consolidation for groups of 
corporate affiliates, if a company would like to avoid apportionary its income, it could 
incorporate separate affiliates in each province. Mintz and Smart (2004) test whether 
corporate affiliates shift income across provinces through strategic lending and 
borrowing. They find that companies that apportia income are less sensitive to 
provincial tax rate changes than comparable companies that do not apportia income 
(
57). This result arises because firms are less able to engage in “transfer pricing” to 
shift income when the company is taxed under formulary apportionment than when 
the company is taxed on a separate entity basis. Mintz and Smart conclude that if 
corporate groups do not consolidate, then “a number of tax planning devices are 
essentially unrestricted for firms that incorporate separately in separate provinces”.  
                                                 
(
57)  These results hold when inter-jurisdictional tax differences are sufficiently small. Unlike studies 
using US state data, Mintz and Smart are able to exploit a tax base that differentiates between 
companies that do business in more than one province and companies that do business in a single 
province. - 40 - 
In light of this evidence of income shifting, Mintz and Smart suggest that the system 
of separate entity accounting that allows cross-border income shifting leads 
governments to compete mainly for financial flows rather than for productive 
investment in property, plant and equipment. Thus, while governments lose revenue 
through income shifting by not requiring consolidation, they may tolerate this income 
shifting due to its offsetting beneficial effects on the location of real investment.  
 
5.2 Tax  competition,  spillovers  and  efficiency  issues 
 
Apportioning profits according to a factor the firm controls, such as the location of 
capital, may distort a firm’s factor hire decisions. This distortion is in addition to the 
usual distortion that arises from taxing the return to a factor. The new distortion can 
be positive or negative, depending on the relationship between the apportionment-
adjusted tax rate in any given location and the weighted average apportionment 
adjusted total tax rate over all locations. Thus, apportionment can effectively create a 
tax or subsidy to new investment and employment. 
 
5.2.1 Tax  competition   
 
Gordon and Wilson (1986) and Sorensen (2003, 2004) consider how formulary 
apportionment affects inter-jurisdictional tax competition. Gordon and Wilson argue 
that since jurisdictions do not take into account the beneficial spillover effects of 
capital reallocation, formulary apportionment will increase tax competition relative to 
separate accounting. By contrast, Sorensen accounts for both the positive and negative 
spillover effects and concludes that a domestic tax increase within a formulary 
apportionment system might lead to negative investment and revenue impacts in the 
foreign jurisdiction. Since the domestic jurisdiction does not take these negative 
effects into account, tax rates will be too high under formula apportionment. Thus, 
formulary apportionment reduces tax competition relative to separate accounting. 
 
Nielsen, Raimondos-Moller and Schejelderup (2001) also examined how formulary 
apportionment may alter tax competition relative to separate accounting. For example, 
since tax revenues under separate accounting are vulnerable to profit shifting, 
governments tend to reduce their tax rates to preserve the tax base. This situation 
leads to competitive tax rate reductions across jurisdictions. However, if it is costly 
for a firm to manipulate its transfer prices (e.g., through penalties for mis-stating 
transfer prices), then tax competition will be reduced. Furthermore, since under these 
conditions firms have a reduced incentive to manipulate their transfer prices under the 
separate accounting system, a system of formulary apportionment will increase tax 
competition. 
 
Pethig and Wagener (2003) examine how the strength of tax competition varies under 
different formula definitions, assuming that all jurisdictions adopt the same formula. 
They find that tax competition will be greater the greater the sensitivity of the factors 
to changes in tax rates. For example, the negative impact is largest under a property 
formula, followed by a sales formula and then by a payroll formula. 
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Although, in theory, applying a formula with factors that are relatively insensitive to 
tax rate changes reduces tax competition, in practice, formulary apportionment may or 
may not reduce tax competition within the European Union. The amount of tax 
competition depends on which formula is chosen. Moreover, whether one formula is 
more or less elastic than another formula depends on the underlying production 
technologies.  
 
Finally, Pethig and Wagener (2003) suggest that if the apportionment formula does 
not include capital (property), a tax increase may not necessarily have a stronger 
impact on domestic investment under formulary apportionment than under separate 
accounting. As they explain, “It is conceivable that a tax increase leads to an increase 
in foreign investment when a property-share formula is applied while the same tax 
increase would lead to a decrease of foreign investment under sales-based 
apportionment”.  
 
5.2.2 Spillover  effects 
 
The spillover effects from a domestic tax rate increase within an apportionment 
system are ambiguous. Assume that total profits are distributed according to the 
location of capital (property). On the one hand, since jurisdictions share the tax base, 
the tax rate increase drives up the average tax rate that applies to both domestic and 
foreign profits. This increase reduces investment and revenue in all jurisdictions. The 
positive effect from investment re-allocation offsets this negative effect. The domestic 
tax rate increase causes the firm to shift its investment out of the higher tax 
jurisdiction into the lower tax jurisdiction. This investment re-allocation boosts 
foreign tax revenues. As these two effects offset, the overall impact is ambiguous. 
 
If companies do not re-allocate their investment, however, the spillover effects will be 
unambiguously negative. Sorensen (2003) presented a case where domestic and 
foreign investment are equally sensitive to domestic tax rate changes. In this situation, 
a domestic tax rate increase has no effect on the distribution of investment across 
locations. Therefore, because the positive spillover effect from the re-allocation of 
investment does not arise, foreign tax revenue unambiguously falls.  
 
5.2.3  The definition of the formula and efficiency issues  
 
Wellisch (2003) considered the type of formula that a country would prefer. In 
general, countries would prefer either a formula based on the location of immobile 
resources, such as labor, as the only apportionment factor or a formula based entirely 
on destination-based sales. In either case, traditional tax competition does not arise 
since, by excluding capital (property), neither formula directly affects the competition 
for mobile capital. In terms of tax incidence, a formula based entirely on labor (either 
compensation or number of employees) would shift the full burden of the tax to 
immobile labor (or, more generally, any other immobile factor included in the 
formula). If the formula includes sales, then the incidence of the tax depends on the 
sales elasticity. In this case, both local consumers and foreign consumers are likely to 
bear some portion of the apportioned tax.  - 42 - 
This result echoes earlier analysis by McLure (1980, 1981a) that the sales element of 
the apportionment formula is roughly equivalent to a sales tax that is shifted forward 
to consumers, while the labor element of the apportionment is roughly equivalent to a 
payroll tax that is shifted to workers as a form of wage tax. Mieszkowski and Morgan 
(1984) found that the immobile factors of production, labor and consumption bear the 
burden of the state corporate income tax. They also found that the state tax drives the 
return to capital down in the nation as a whole. 
 
Wellisch (2002) examines the type of formula that a firm might prefer. He notes that 
even though statutory tax rates may increase under a payroll-based formula, 
multinational firms would prefer a payroll-based formula since the immobile factor, 
e.g., payroll, bears the tax burden. That preference, moreover, extends to a general 
preference by multinational firms for formulary apportionment using a labor-based 
formula over the current system of separate accounting. Wellisch, thus, concludes that 
even though the effect is not very transparent, the increase in after-tax profit “could 
become one of the basic benefits to firm owners of switching to a system of formulary 
apportionment".  
 
These studies confirm the analysis presented in the US context by Anand and Sansing 
(2000). They investigated why some states have remained with the equally weighted 
three-factor formula while others have shifted toward a destination-based sales 
formula. They find that states prefer an apportionment formula that reflects the 
relative mobility of the state’s industrial base. The more immobile the factor, the more 
likely the state will include that factor in its apportionment formula. If a state’s 
industrial base is relatively immobile, such as in the mining and petroleum industries, 
the state is more likely to use a formula that places a heavy weight on the relatively 
immobile factors. By contrast, states that import a large share of the tax base are more 
likely to shift taxes to firms that sell in the state, regardless of where the firms have 
located their production. Thus, these states will choose a formula with a relatively 
heavy weight on destination-based sales (
58). 
 
Edmiston (2002) investigated how a state responds to the factor choices made in other 
states. Using an applied general equilibrium analysis, Edmiston finds that regardless 
of what other states do, each state’s best economic development strategy is to choose 
a single-factor sales formula. These beneficial may only last for a short-term, 
however, as companies may re-locate over time or other states may also modify their 
state formula. If all states move to a single-factor sales formula, then some states are 
better off while other states are worse off. For this reason, Edmiston suggests that 
many states would be better off if they had not entered the “strategic apportionment 
formula” game. However, once one state has made that move, it is in every state’s 
interest to move to a single-factor formula. Barring any federal action to prohibit such 
moves, the result will be that all states use a destination-based sales formula. 
 
Returning to the European Union context, Gérard and Weiner (2003) examined 
another feature of formulary apportionment and group taxation: how uncertainty may 
affect investment spending and tax competition in a system of consolidated base 
                                                 
(
58) The fact that Anand and Sansing (2000) also show that social welfare would be higher under any 
common formula than under non-uniform formulae highlights the importance of obtaining agreement 
on the formula regardless of how it is defined. - 43 - 
taxation and formulary apportionment. The uncertainty arises because a firm may not 
sell all of its output and, since the firm incurs costs even if it does not sell its 
production, it will then incur losses. With cross-border loss offset, the firm can use 
these losses to offset profits in other jurisdictions. 
 
In contrast to the separate-entity method, since governments share the global tax base 
under formulary apportionment, they will be eager to attract foreign investment 
because that investment partially insures them against revenue losses from negative 
country-specific shocks. Thus, a switch to formulary apportionment from separate 
accounting may increase tax competition because additional capital investment creates 
greater revenue not only when the firm is profitable but also when the firm is 
unprofitable, as long as the firm is profitable overall. Therefore, once cross-border 
loss offset is available within a system of separate accounting, replacing that system 
with formulary apportionment will increase tax competition. 
 
Mintz and Weiner (2003) evaluate the efficiency aspects of moving to formulary 
apportionment in the European Union. They find that as long as tax rates continue to 
differ across Member States, economic inefficiencies will exist under formulary 
apportionment. However, since it is not clear whether the inefficiencies that 
apportionment introduces are empirically more important than those that it removes, 
the efficiency gains in moving from the existing systems to an optional formulary 
apportionment system are unknown. 
 
5.3  Tax planning under apportionment  
 
Although formulary apportionment removes some tax planning opportunities, it does 
not remove all such opportunities. Using firm-level data from a confidential survey 
from the IRS Coordinated Examination Program for 1991 to 1995, Gupta and Mills 
(2003) investigated how multistate companies may exploit cross-state variations in 
corporate tax practices to reduce their tax burden. As long as the company does not 
have a taxable presence in every state, it can take advantage of (at least) two 
multistate tax planning techniques. First, if it is in a state without a sales throwback 
rule, it can sell into a state where it has no taxable presence and create “nowhere” 
income. Such sales are not included in the numerator of any state’s sales factor even 
though the sales are included in the denominator measuring total sales.  
 
Second, if the company is located in a state that does not require unitary combination, 
it can shelter its income from intangibles by transferring its intangible property to a 
holding company in a low tax jurisdiction. Under this tax-planning technique, the 
company transfers intangible assets into a legally separate entity located in a low-tax 
separate reporting state. The company then pays tax-deductible royalties to the 
holding company which, in turn, pays low or no taxes on royalty income. As long as 
the entity is not located in a combined reporting state, this transaction creates no tax 
liability.  
 
Klassen and Shackelford (1998) focused on how companies in the US and Canada 
manipulate the location of sales, the “purported primary method of subnational tax 
avoidance” to reduce their tax burden. They found evidence consistent with - 44 - 
corporations shifting their tax bases to more favorably taxed jurisdictions. 
Manufacturing companies can strategically structure their shipments to reduce sales 
reported to states with relatively heavy sales taxation, especially when selling from 
states that do not have a sales throwback rule.  
 
Some evidence of corporate tax planning is found by inference. For example, the 
growth in state and local tax practices at accounting firms and the decline in the share 
of corporate income tax receipts to total tax receipts may provide indirect evidence of 
the increase in corporate tax planning. On the first point, Gupta and Mills (2003) 
suggest that the growing importance of state and local tax planning is demonstrated 
by, for example, the 1,000 percent increase in revenues earned by one accounting 
firm’s state and local tax practice from 1995-2000. On the second point, US Census 
Bureau data show that corporate income taxes made up 6.3 percent of state tax 
revenues in 2000 compared with 10.2 percent of state revenues in 1979. 
  
Mazerov (2002) has argued that many state corporate income tax laws are “riddled 
with loopholes” that allow many large multistate corporations to avoid paying the 
proper amount of tax. Mazerov charges that the growth in tax planning “has 
undoubtedly contributed” to the reduced importance of the corporate income tax as a 
state revenue source. The Multistate Tax Commission (2003a) estimates that 
corporate tax sheltering reduced state corporate income tax revenues by more than 
one-third in 2001 (
59). 
 
Fox and Luna (2002) identify the shrinking corporate income tax base as the key 
explanatory factor behind the relative fall in the contribution of the corporate income 
tax to state tax revenues. They identify four elements causing this shrinkage: cyclical 
reductions in corporate profits, declines in the federal corporate tax base, state policy 
changes designed to reduce corporate tax burdens and “more aggressive corporate tax 
planning”. Pomp (1999) also argues that many of the provisions that states adopt to 
stimulate economic development also facilitate tax planning so that it is mis-leading 
to ascribe the declines in corporate tax revenues solely to corporate tax planning. 
 
Many states have adopted a double-weighted sales factor formula to encourage 
economic development. This formula reduces the tax burden on companies that 
produce in the state but sell out of the state and, therefore, also reduces corporate tax 
revenues. For example, Smith (2000) reports that Illinois estimated an annual $63 
million revenue loss once the state fully implemented the single-factor sales formula, 
while New Mexico estimated an annual $12 million revenue loss from moving to a 
double-weighted sales factor. Pomp (1999) reported that, in the aggregate, states that 
have moved toward a formula with a disproportionate weight on the sales factor lose 
$500 million in corporate tax revenue each year (
60). 
 
                                                 
(
59) The Multistate Tax Commission (2003a) argues that combined reporting states are less vulnerable 
to tax sheltering than separate entity states. To support this claim, the MTC notes that the median 
decline in effective corporate income tax rates between 1986 and 1997 was 38 percent for separate 
entity states compared with just 20 percent for combined reporting states.  
(
60) Pomp based the estimates on phone conversations with revenue analysts in all states whose formula 
deviates from the equally weighted three-factor formula.  - 45 - 
Not all of the reduction in state corporate income tax revenue arises from state policy 
choices. For example, Governor James McGreevey (2002) of New Jersey blamed the 
fall in state corporate tax revenues from 15 percent of state tax revenue to about 4 
percent on “tax loopholes and accounting gimmicks” that allowed companies to shift 
their profits. Richard Kaluzny (2003), the Assistant Director of the Office of Revenue 
and Economic Analysis in New Jersey characterized the corporate business tax as a 
“voluntary contribution” that had no links to the underlying economics. To close these 
loopholes, New Jersey enacted a tax reform that, among others, restricted tax 
deductions for certain payments made to out-of-state related parties.  
 
Holding companies and intangible income shifting 
 
Companies doing business in states that do not require combined reporting can reduce 
their tax liabilities by creating an intangible holding company in a state that taxes 
intangible income at favorable rates, or not at all. To achieve this result, the company 
transfers its intangible property, say a trademark, to the holding company, which 
licenses the intangible property back to the parent company in exchange for royalty 
payments. Most states allow tax deductions for royalty payments and, in most cases, 
the holding company will pay little or no income taxes on the royalty income. As long 
as the holding company does not have a taxable presence in the parent company’s 
state, it will not be subject to that state’s tax on this income.  
 
The same type of strategy applies with loans or any type of tax-deductible payment. 
For example, the holding company may make a loan to the parent company, which 
will then deduct the interest payments made to the holding company. These 
transactions reduce taxable income to the parent company without creating offsetting 
taxable income to the holding company. 
 
5.4  Government responses  
 
Many commentators have noted that applying the state tax on a unitary basis 
combined would eliminate this income shifting technique (
61). Since this method 
includes the income and apportionment factors in the combined report, it prevents 
companies from reducing taxable income by shifting passive investments to holding 
companies, whereas in separate-entity states, the subsidiary’s income and factors do 
not affect the calculations of the parent’s apportionable income and factors. Noting 
that “modern-day tax planning techniques result in a stealth attack on the tax base", 
Pomp (1999) argues that a state that does not require related corporations to file a 
combined report is “at the mercy of its corporate taxpayers”.  
 
By modifying their corporate structure, such companies may also modify their tax 
liabilities and state tax revenues. However, Faber (2003) counters that “states that do 
not require combined returns … should not complain when corporations choose … to 
operate their businesses in more than one legal entity … the tax consequences that 
flow from such a corporate structure are a direct consequence of the state’s decision 
not to require combined returns".  
                                                 
(
61) See, for example, McIntyre, Mines and Pomp (2001) and Mazerov (2002). - 46 - 
Fox and Luna (2002) agree that requiring combined reporting would reduce the tax 
base loss through holding companies. However, they argue that combined reporting is 
not a panacea for the state tax problems, as it is difficult to define a unitary business 
and combined reporting makes the corporate tax more complex. Kaluzny (2003) 
explains that although mandatory unitary combined reporting is desirable on 
theoretical grounds, it is difficult to move to the system as a practical matter unless all 
other states move to the system simultaneously. Such a move is highly unlikely, given 
the strong business opposition to combined reporting. 
 
As of 2004, sixteen states require combined reporting (See Table 1). Although many 
states have considered adopted combined reporting, only one state has adopted the 
method in recent years. Vermont adopted combined reporting effective in 2006. 
 
Given the difficulties in adopting combined reporting to prevent tax avoidance, 
McIntyre, Mines and Pomp (2001) identify some alternative techniques that states 
may employ to restrict inappropriate tax planning. For example, states may disallow 
the transfer of intangible assets to a holding company as lacking a business purpose or 
lacking economic substance. States may deny deductions for these interest, royalty 
and similar payments because they are not legitimate business expenses or they are 
“sham” transactions. They may re-characterize payments to the holding company as 
capital expenditures or re-characterize the debt instrument as an equity investment and 
thus transform deductible interest payments to non-deductible dividend payments. 
 
State revenue authorities may also restrict this tax planning opportunity by ruling that 
an out-of-state company has created a taxable connection with the state through the 
in-state use of its intangible property. For example, an out of state company that 
licenses its intangible property to an in-state franchise may be deemed to have 
‘property’ in the state when the franchise uses its intangible property in the state. The 
intangible property creates a taxable connection even though the taxpayer has no 
physical presence in the state. 
 
Some state courts have determined that the presence of “intangible property” in a state 
is sufficient to create a taxable nexus with the state. For example, the South Carolina 
State court ruled that the use of the trademark in South Carolina created a taxable 
presence for the out of state holding company. The state court ruled that Geoffrey, the 
Delaware trademark-holding subsidiary of Toys R Us, which had stores in South 
Carolina, had “purposefully directed its activities toward South Carolina”’ and that 
“the minimum connection required by due process is satisfied by the presence of 
Geoffrey’s intangible property in this State” (
62).  
 
                                                 
(
62) See McIntyre, Mines and Pomp (2001). See Hellerstein (1995) for an analysis of this case. - 47 - 
5.5  Potential issues under value added at origin 
 
As the Commission Study (2002, p. 504) suggests, basing the allocation formula on 
the respective ‘value added’ in each Member State is an alternative to the 
apportionment methods used in North America. The Commission suggests that if 
companies made certain adjustments to the existing VAT data, it might consider using 
value added as a possible allocation method. 
 
5.5.1  Value added at origin 
 
All EU Member States apply a multistage consumption-type value added tax, using 
the credit invoice method with zero-rating for exports (
63). Subject to key adjustments 
to the calculation used for value added consumption tax purposes, this measure of 
value added may represent the value created by a company doing business in each 
Member State(
64). These key adjustments would convert the consumption/destination-
based measure of value added to an income/origin-based measure of value added. 
After these adjustments, the measure of value added should indicate the value added 
in the location of production (
65). 
 
To use value added at origin as the apportionment formula, it would be necessary to 
make two adjustments to the calculations of value added for consumption tax 
purposes in the European Union. First, the tax base should be adjusted to include 
exports and to exclude imports. This adjustment would create a measure of value 
added where the goods are produced rather than where they are consumed.  
 
Second, capital depreciation allowances should replace the expensing of capital 
expenditures. This adjustment would measure value added on an income basis. This 
adjustment also would have the practical effect of not creating large changes in value 
added when a firm undertakes a large, long-term capital investment project (
66).  
 
Definition of value added 
 
Value added measures a firm’s business activity in a location. As Musgrave (1984) 
explains, “income has its source where the factor services which generate that income 
operate, a concept of value added at origin".  In this manner, value added equals the 
payment made to any factor of production, e.g., labor and capital, used in the 
                                                 
(
63) I am grateful to Emil Sunley for his assistance with this section. 
(
64) As Hellerstein and McLure (2004) note, because the EU VAT is based on the credit method, the 
value added taxes in the EU do not, in fact, calculate value added. As Tait (1988) explains, “The 
method used [the subtractive-indirect method] never actually calculates the value added; instead, the 
tax rate is applied to a component of value added (output and inputs) and the resultant tax liabilities are 
subtracted to get the final net tax payable”. 
(
65) See Kenyon (1996) and Ebrill, Keen, Bodin and Summers (2001) for detailed discussions of 
various issues concerning the calculation of value added. 
(
66) Such an adjustment is not strictly necessary, however. Assuming that the EU chooses to use value 
added as the apportionment factor, the treatment of capital expenditures in the measure of value added 
would, presumably form part of the entire discussion of the definition of the common formula and tax 
base. (Michigan, which has a modified value-added type tax base, for example, allowed complete 
expensing for capital expenditures until 1997). - 48 - 
production process. Employee compensation equals the payments to labor, while 
profits, interest and rent are the payments to capital owners.  
 
Value added can be calculated in two equivalent manners: under the subtraction 
method and under the addition method. Under the subtraction method, value added is 
the difference between total revenues and the costs of materials used in production. 
Under the addition method, value added is the sum of payments to all factors of 
production. These two measures, by definition, must equal the same amount.  
 
Administratively, the addition method may be simpler to implement than the 
subtraction method since a taxpayer may use figures from its income tax return to 
calculate value added. The method allows companies to identify each of the individual 
elements of value added. 
 
5.5.2 Potential  economic  consequences 
 
McLure (2002a) explains that using value added at origin as the apportionment factor 
can be interpreted as combining payroll and the return to capital (inclusive of 
payments for interest expense) into a single apportionment factor, with each element 
weighted by its relative importance in production. Thus, a value added at origin 
formula allocates income to the marketing location solely through the capital and 
labor used in the marketing location.  
 
Furthermore, as with the traditional formula, a value added at origin formula would 
act as an implicit tax on whatever was included in the formula. Since labor 
compensation accounts for about two-thirds of value added, the measure would 
effectively transform much of the corporate income tax to a labor tax (
67). With 
payroll implicitly weighted by two-thirds and property weighted by one-third, firms 
may be encouraged to substitute away from the more-heavily taxed labor toward the 
less-heavily taxed capital, although this effect would depend, among others, upon the 
relative productivity of the factors (
68). 
 
To reduce the relatively high implicit tax on payroll that might arise from 
apportioning income according to value added at origin, the measure of value added 
could exclude employee compensation. Value added at origin would then become 
essentially a measure of the return to capital, where capital would include not only 
profits, but also payments of dividends, interest, rent and royalties (
69).  
                                                 
(
67)  Compensation accounted for 75 percent of net value added and 66 percent of gross value added for 
non-financial corporate business in the United States in 2002. See US Government, Economic Report 
of the President (2004). Similar ratios appear in Canada where, in 1995, labor compensation accounted 
for about 70 percent of business net value added at factor cost. See the study done by Sargent et. al. 
(1998) for the Technical Committee on Business Taxation. 
(
68) As shown in Weiner (1994), the cross-state variation in payroll and capital apportionment tax rates 
was not large enough to have a statistically significant impact on relative factor choices. Whether this 
relationship would hold at the level of EU company tax rates is unknown. A pure value added tax 
would not necessarily distort the choices between labor and capital. 
(
69) Some economists suggest that labor is not a proper measure of the factor generating profits. 
Hellerstein and McLure (2004), for example, state that “there is little theoretical reason to include the 
cost of labor in an apportionment formula, no matter what its conceptual foundation (p. 214)".  - 49 - 
 
However, eliminating compensation from value added raises some practical concerns. 
First, value added could become negative. In such an instance, alternative means of 
calculating value added, say taking a multi-year average, would be necessary. Second, 
it would encourage governments to tinker with the measure of compensation either to 
increase the share of income apportioned to their location or to make their location 
more attractive to business (
70). Presumably, Member States would be prevented from 
undertaking this type of “factor manipulation” as part of the agreement to move to the 
new tax method. Since labor compensation accounts for a substantial share of the 
value-added base, firms would face strong incentives to locate compensation in tax-
favored locations or to minimize compensation attributed to high-tax locations. The 
EU Member States may need to apply anti-abuse measures to limit these strategies. 
 
Some computational issues arise in calculating adjusted value added at origin from the 
existing value added calculations. As Westberg (2002) notes, transactions that are 
taxable for value added consumption tax purposes might not necessarily be taxable for 
income tax purposes. Moreover, using figures calculated for the consumption-based 
value added tax might result in companies being subject to taxation in a location 
where a corporation is not resident and does not have a permanent establishment.  
 
According to Schön (2002), although using value added would eliminate incentives to 
shift profits through altering the financial structure, it would not eliminate the need for 
a company to justify its internal transfer prices for related party sales and services. 
Gérard (2002) argues that consolidated base taxation with apportionment using a 
value added formula does not rule out transfer pricing strategies or tax competition. 
The only way to rule out tax shifting strategies is by setting tax rates and the tax base 
equal.  
 
Certain concerns that arise under the traditional apportionment formula also are likely 
to arise under the alternative formula. For example, each of the elements that makes 
up value added is firm specific, suggesting that the firm will have some control over 
where to assign those elements. Similar difficulties that arise in locating intangible 
income under the traditional formulary apportionment methods would arise in 
determining the location of dividend, interest and royalty payments that would be 
included in a value added formula.  
 
Hellerstein and McLure (2004) emphasize that using value added at origin creates an 
incentive to manipulate transfer prices that does not exist when value added is 
measured on a destination basis. Thus, this measure re-introduces the need to monitor 
transfer prices. In addition, they stress the importance of finding accurate transfer 
prices for intangible assets, such as intellectual property, to prevent shifting value 
added out of high-tax locations. In light of these issues, they conclude that the transfer 
pricing problem is “the Achilles heel” of the proposal to use value added at origin to 
apportion income (
71). 
                                                 
(
70) Knittel (1998) provides evidence from Michigan that the legislature altered the definition of 
compensation for various purposes. 
(
71) This language echoes that used by Jerome Hellerstein (1982), Walter’s father, who described the 
inability to establish fair arm’s length prices for goods transferred, or basic operational services - 50 - 
 
Concern about the relative distribution of income to the marketing and manufacturing 
states is another issue that may affect the use of value added at origin as the sole 
apportionment factor. Value added at origin attributes income to the location of the 
factors of production, i.e., property and payroll. However, as explained earlier, there 
are strong arguments in favor of using a formula that allocates some income to the 
marketing location. Except for the US states that use a single-factor gross receipts 
formula, the formulae in the US states and the Canadian provinces take both demand 
and supply into account.  
 
As Musgrave (1984) explains, pursuing a “supply-demand approach which holds that 
market value is created through the interplay of supply and demand” is one way to 
reach interjurisdictional equity (
72). Under this approach, the formula would distribute 
the tax base according to the locations where value is added and where the product is 
used. To take into consideration both the manufacturing and marketing states with a 
formula using value added at origin as a factor, the formula should also include gross 
receipts at destination as a factor (
73). 
 
                                                                                                                                            
rendered, between controlled branches or subsidiaries of an enterprise as the “Achilles heel” of separate 
accounting. 
(
72) Musgrave further explains that this approach goes beyond the claim to profits attributed to capital 
and labor in the location, which the supply approach covers. Attributing some income to the location of 
demand, Musgrave argues (p. 234), “is the only valid rationale for the inclusion of a sales factor in the 
formula". If demand creates value, then the location of sales would be entitled to a share of the profits. 
Whether the location of demand should be entitled to a share of the profits would be a matter for those 
agreeing to use a formula to allocate profits to decide. 
(
73) Introducing destination-based sales into the apportionment process also raises issues concerning the 
location of sales, as discussed earlier. - 51 - 
 
6. ASSESSMENT   
 
This section distills the main conclusions from the foregoing analysis and presents an 
overall assessment of formulary apportionment and consolidated base taxation in the 
European Union. 
 
Simplicity and practicality are the guiding principles that shape the basic contours of a 
system of formulary apportionment with group taxation system. While this evaluation 
of the experiences in the United States and Canada provides many insights that can 
assist the EU as it designs an apportionment system, given the different political 
structures, there are limits to how much guidance that experience may provide to the 
EU Member States.  
 
Perhaps the most important lesson to learn from the US states is the importance of 
escaping the complications that arise when jurisdictions independently set ‘cross-
border’ tax policy. Specifically, the EU should take steps to avoid going down the 
path toward chaos. As McLure and Weiner (2000) suggested: “Formula 
apportionment in the US: Chaos to be avoided".   Hellerstein and McLure (2004) 
expressed a similar sentiment: “’Don’t do what we do’ summarizes our overall 
appraisal of what the EU can learn from the U.S. state experience with taxation based 
on formulary apportionment".  
 
In this regard, the experience in the Canadian provinces demonstrates the benefits of 
uniformity and, therefore, provides a good model for the EU to study. As Weiner 
(1991) noted in a paper discussing the use of formulary apportionment in the 
European Community:  “These results suggest that the Canadian system provides an 
instructive case study to explore the implications of apportionment for the European 




In contrast to the US experience, the Canadian federal and provincial governments 
worked together to gain agreement on the outlines of the apportionment formula and 
tax base at the time that the provinces implemented the allocation system. As Mintz 
(2004) explains, the development of the Canadian corporate tax system reflects 
various competing objectives and has developed a relatively good balance taking into 
account both federal and provincial concerns. 
  
Thus, the importance of gaining agreement among the EU Member States on a 
common tax base and common formula is a crucial insight from the experience in the 
United States and Canada. Reaching agreement on a common base and common 
formula, however, does not mean that Member State’s lose their autonomy in setting 
local tax policy. As shown in Canada, once the common tax base is distributed using a 
                                                 
(
74) Weiner (1991) suggested the following: a single apportionment formula, a European income base, 
tax incentives offered after income has been apportioned to Member States and tax rates set by the 
Member States. - 52 - 
common formula, national tax authorities may create a favorable investment climate 




6.1  The apportionment formula and factor weights 
 
Designing a formula that produces a reasonably fair distribution of income across the 
EU Member States is critical. It is also important that the formula be administratively 
feasible. With these issues in mind, this section discusses a potential apportionment 
formula for the EU. 
 
The apportionment formula for the EU should use factors that relate to the firm’s own 
factors. Although a formula that distributes income across the Member States 
according to macroeconomic factors would eliminate the distortions that arise with 
firm-specific factors, the absence of a link between a firm’s profits and its income tax 
liability is a drawback to a macro-based formula.  
 
These firm-specific factors should encompass the traditional property, payroll and 
gross receipts factors. Property and payroll would be measured at origin and gross 
receipts at destination. Balancing the interests of the manufacturing the marketing 
locations is an important issue in choosing apportionment factors. The decades of 
experience in the US and Canada with these factors can help guide the EU in choosing 
its formula and defining the apportionment factors. 
 
If the EU chooses the three-factor formula, the property and payroll factors should 
each be weighted by one-fourth and the gross receipts factor should be weighted by 
one-half. Alternatively, the Canadian formula that includes equally-weighted payroll 
and gross receipts is simple and practical and maintains the balance between the 
producing and marketing locations. Unlike the first formula described, this formula, 







The treatment of intangible income and property poses particularly difficult issues 
and, at this time, no broadly acceptable approach has been offered for dealing with 
intangibles. Thus, this section merely offers some preliminary thoughts for reflection. 
 
Property. Because of the difficulties that arise not only in valuing intangibles but also 
in determining their “location", it may be most practical at this time to exclude 
intangible property from the formula (with exceptions for certain industries, such as 
financial services). While there are drawbacks to this approach, the advantages of 
excluding intangible property appear sufficiently great at this time to justify excluding 
them. McLure (1997) may have provided the best justification for excluding 
                                                 
(
75) In offering tax credits, EU Member States must comply with any restrictions concerning state aid. - 53 - 
intangibles from the property factor: “if one wants to determine the location, as well 
as the value of intangible assets, one is likely to be forced into analysis similar to that 
under the separate accounting standard”.  
 
If intangible property is included in the property factor, then the transfer pricing rules 
applied for determining ownership and for valuing intangible property at the 
international level would be imported into the apportionment system. Such an 
outcome might negate many of the benefits of the apportionment system. 
 
Receipts. Excluding certain intangible receipts that do not have a readily identifiable 
location from the gross receipts factor also seems to be a practical suggestion to 
consider at this time. Thus, if the intangible receipts cannot be identified with any 
particular income producing activity, then they can be excluded entirely from the 
gross receipts factor. 
 
As with finding a value for intangible property, a location can be found for intangible 
receipts. For example, gross receipts from the sale, licensing or use of intangible 
personal property could be assigned to a location if the income producing activity that 
generated the receipts occurs in the location. If that activity occurred in more than one 
location, the receipts could be divided according to the share of activity in each 
location. 
 
Excluding intangible property and receipts does not mean that intangibles are not 
represented in the tax system. The effect of excluding intangible property and income 
from the formula is to distribute the receipts according to the location of gross receipts 
as well as to the employees and capital that developed the intangible property. This 
process recognizes that the receipts generated from intangibles belong to the entire 
business, not to any specific location.  
 
6.2 Sector-specific  formulae 
 
The general property, payroll and gross receipts formula is appropriate for 
manufacturing and mercantile industries. A different formula, however, may be 
appropriate for other industries. Sector-specific formulae may more accurately 
represent the factors that generate income for these diverse industries than does a 
general formula. Thus, the practices in the US states and Canadian provinces of 
providing sector-specific formulae for a few industries seems reasonable. 
 
However, using multiple formulae has its drawbacks. For example, enterprises with 
multiple lines of business have to determine which income and which factors 
belonged to which business. This process could reintroduce the transfer pricing issue. 
The greater the number of divisions drawn between businesses, the greater the need to 
preserve existing rules to maintain that separation among businesses. 
 
Taxpayers should have the opportunity to request a different formula if the standard 
formula does not fairly represent their activity in a location. This flexibility would 
allow using specific factors for that industry.  
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6.3 The  group   
 
Group taxation is essential to reflect the nature of EU multinational businesses and 
forms part of the Commission’s long-term strategy to provide EU companies the 
option to use a consolidated tax base for their EU-wide activities. Providing group 
taxation will also help restrict income-shifting problems like those that arise in the US 
states that tax on a separate entity basis and in the Canadian provinces where 
consolidation is prohibited. 
 
The company group can be defined in many ways, each of which attempts to address 
a certain feature of group taxation. If the notion of legal control were followed, the 
group would include entities that met a specific legal degree of ownership, say more 
than 50 percent. If economic control and interdependence were followed, the group 
could include entities that shared certain economic attributes, such as a substantial 
flow of goods or services.  
 
At this point, the consolidated group should be defined according to an ownership 
test. To be consistent with EU practices, an appropriate threshold could be one that 
paralleled thresholds used in other EU company tax areas. Majority-ownership 
appears important as it assumes control over the entity. Using this threshold also 
would prevent including an entity in more than one consolidated group. (The 
treatment of joint ventures would need to be addressed). 
 
Although the unitary business concept has its complications, there are good arguments 
to consider in the future the possibility of extending the group definition beyond 
ownership. Taking into account the substance of the economic relationship among 
related companies would also help limit the ability of companies to manipulate their 
corporate structure for tax purposes. Such a step would only make sense, however, if a 
reasonable definition of a unitary business could be agreed. 
 
6.4  Taxable presence and the taxable base  
 
To benefit from international experience in this area, the EU should follow 
developments in the permanent establishment area to determine whether an entity has 
a sufficient taxable presence in the state to become subject to taxation in the state. The 
Canadian provinces apply this procedure within their formulary allocation system. 
However, as this notion currently requires a physical presence, it may not adequately 
deal with the new technologies that have arisen. Efforts at the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development could help the EU refine this notion for its 
purposes. 
 
Many options exist for defining the taxable base. The US states generally distinguish 
between apportionable and non-apportionable income to meet constitutional restraints 
on their taxation powers. States may not tax income or operations that do not meet 
constitutionally required levels of connection with the state. Much of the US state 
litigation has centered on evaluating exactly what type and degree of connection a 
company must have with a state to create a taxable link. Such constitutional 
restrictions, however, would not apply at the international level. - 55 - 
A simple solution is to distribute all income by formula. In doing so, the EU would 
eliminate the distinction between income distributed by formula and income assigned 
to a particular location. 
 
Although it is a simple solution, in many cases, certain items of income may have no 
relationship to the ongoing trade or business and should not be included in the tax 
base that is distributed across all locations. For example, the income from the sale of 
property that had no connection with the business might be assigned to a particular 
location instead of being apportioned. 
 
In such cases, provisions in bilateral tax treaties and the OECD Model Convention 
could be followed to distinguish between business profits and specific items of 
income. Business profits are apportioned across the Member States while “non-
business profits” (i.e., specific items of income) would be allocated to a particular 
Member State. Many countries have extensive experience in applying different tax 
rules to different categories of income, depending on the relationship between those 
items of income and the entity’s business.  
 
6.5 Territorial  scope   
 
The scope of the consolidated system with formulary apportionment should be limited 
to the European Union’s territorial borders. (This notion has been referred to as the 
EU water’s edge).  
 
Limiting the territorial scope to the EU’s territorial borders requires maintaining the 
current international tax rules with respect to income and activities outside of the 
EU’s territorial borders. The source of income needs to be determined and arm’s 
length pricing continues to hold for all related companies located outside the EU 
boundaries.  
 
6.6 Compliance  issues   
 
Simplicity and practicality are the key elements underlining the assessment of 
formulary apportionment in the EU. These elements also may help reduce compliance 
costs. 
 
Many compliance cost studies show that compliance costs are greater under a non-
uniform system than under a uniform system. However, what they do not show is 
whether compliance costs are lower under separate accounting or under formulary 
apportionment. The relative amount of compliance costs depends, among other issues, 
on the definition of each system and the amount of uniformity in the system. For 
example, all else equal, compliance costs would likely be lower regardless of which 
system is used if all Member States used the same tax base. However, even if tax 
bases were uniform, both separate accounting and formulary apportionment require 
potentially complex anti-abuse measures and both create costs associated with tax 
planning, tax compliance and tax administration. 
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To the extent that the EU maintains two systems, formulary apportionment within the 
EU and arm’s length pricing for non-EU matters, compliance costs may rise relative 
to the current system. Since the system will be limited to the EU’s territorial 
boundaries, tax administrators must adopt measures to prevent the improper shifting 
of income to tax havens located outside of the European Union. Likewise, although 
resources devoted to implementing the transfer pricing system would likely decrease 
as many internal EU transactions would no longer require finding transfer prices, tax 
authorities would have to maintain expertise in the two different tax systems.  
 
As earlier indicated, the Commission proposed making the consolidated base tax 
system with formulary apportionment optional. Although making the system optional 
may have many political advantages, it may also introduce some economic 
disadvantages. As Mintz (2002) highlights, allowing companies the option to choose 
their tax method “would substantially erode efficiency gains from harmonization 
since companies would have greater opportunities to engage in tax arbitrage 
domestically, not just with respect to cross-border transactions".  
 
6.7 International  consensus   
 
The cooperative efforts to develop and apply separate accounting and arm’s length 
pricing method in a consistent manner at the international level demonstrate the 
importance of consensus. For this reason, before the EU introduces a formulary-based 
system, it should gain agreement among a sufficient number of Member States to 
reach uniformity in the group definition, tax base and apportionment formula. The 
availability of enhanced cooperation should enhance the ability of the EU to reach this 
critical number. 
 
Since the EU plans to limit the apportionment system to the EU’s territorial limits, it 
may consider looking to the experience in international organizations, such as the 
OECD, for guidance in implementing the arm’s length pricing system for transactions 
that fall outside the EU. As noted during the US Treasury Department (1996) 
conference on implementing formulary apportionment at the international level, 
international consensus is vital to the smooth operation of any multinational tax 
system. Moreover, cooperation seems a reasonable path to take when introducing a 
new method for taxing companies in the EU. 
 
6.8  Overall evaluation  
 
As economic integration continues within the European Union, formulary 
apportionment with group taxation becomes more and more practical, while separate 
accounting with arm’ length pricing seems less and less feasible. As EU companies 
increasingly organize their operations along business lines rather than along 
geographic lines, there is less justification for organizing company taxation at the 
Member State level and more justification for organizing company taxation at the EU 
level. Formulary apportionment with group taxation within the European Union 
appears to be the type of tax system that best reflects the increasingly integrated 
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